

# When Everyone is Visible No One is: Antecedents, Tensions and Consequences of Qualifications Visibility in Labor Search

Robert G. Fichman  
Boston College  
[fichman@bc.edu](mailto:fichman@bc.edu)

[Forthcoming 2025 in the *Journal of the Association of Information Systems*]

**Bio:** Rob Fichman is Professor of Management and Organization at the Carroll School of Management at Boston College. His main research interests concern digital innovation, including the factors affecting the diffusion and assimilation of new IT, and the transformative effects that digital innovations have on individuals, organizations, markets, and society. He has published broadly on these topics in *Communications of the ACM*, *California Management Review*, *Decision Sciences Journal*, *Harvard Business Review*, *Information Systems Research*, *Journal of the Association of Information Systems*, *Management Science*, *MIS Quarterly*, *MIT Sloan Management Review* and other scholarly journals. His more recent work examines emerging digital platforms and technologies that facilitate labor matching (e.g., job boards, professional SNS, online labor markets, internal talent marketplaces) and the implications of these technologies for hiring and staff deployment.

## Abstract

The visibility of qualifications is of central importance to labor search in general and the person-job matching process in particular. However, despite the emergence of LinkedIn and a wide variety of other labor matching technologies (LMTs) that magnify qualifications visibility (QV) and shape it in non-obvious ways, there has been very little attention to QV as a concept, its antecedents, and its consequences. Accordingly, the objectives of this paper are to: (1) define QV and elaborate its dimensionality, (2) delineate how it is magnified and shaped by LMTs, (3) draw on theories of visibility, signaling, and strategic self-presentation to devise a theoretical model of labor search that places QV at its center, and (4) work through the implications of this model for future research on the influence of emerging LMTs and QV on labor search in an organizational context.

**Keywords:** Qualifications, visibility, qualifications visibility, labor matching technology, staffing, hiring, labor search, signaling, application frictions, strategic self-presentation, internal mobility, gigification of work

## 1. Introduction

Visibility has become a popular topic for theorizing in management and communication (Brantner & Stehle, 2021; Brighenti, 2007; Treem et al., 2020), in part due to the rise of technologies that make people and things visible in new ways to new audiences. For example, scholars have developed theories of visibility for *communication* (Leonardi, 2014), *information* (Stohl et al., 2016), and *behavior* (Leonardi & Treem, 2020). Despite growing attention, one kind of visibility that has yet to be theorized is the visibility of *worker qualifications*. This is somewhat surprising, since as I will show, qualifications visibility (QV) has important theoretical implications for labor search, itself a critical element of organizational staffing. A major increase in QV has been triggered by new technologies that capture and display data on workers and their qualifications (Agrawal et al., 2015; Autor, 2009; Purvis, 2016). Among these are job boards, professional social networking sites (SNS), online labor markets, recruitment portals, and internal talent marketplaces. I refer to these as *labor matching technologies (LMTs)* because person-job matching is their most salient function with respect to QV.

In the HR staffing literature, where one might most expect to see theorizing about QV, there appears to be only phenomenological attention to specific technologies that increase QV during recruitment and selection (Breugh, 2008; Hickman et al., 2022; Holm, 2012; Tippins, 2015; Woods et al., 2020), rather than focused theorizing about visibility itself. This attention deficit persists despite a striking rise in QV (LinkedIn now hosts about a billion worker profiles) and the essential role that visible qualifications play in the search for suitable workers and in assessments of person-job fit (Caldwell & O'Reilly III, 1990; Edwards, 1991). One possible explanation is that HR scholars mostly attend to the employer perspective, rather than the individual jobseeker perspective. For example, a large literature considers how employers can *attract jobseeker attention* (Chapman et al., 2005), such as by promoting their employment brands (Cable & Turban, 2003; Theurer et al., 2018) or using the Internet to increase the visibility of open jobs (Baum & Kabst, 2014)—but there is not a correspondingly large literature on how *individuals can attract employer attention*, such as by making their qualifications more visible.<sup>1</sup> Even in research that takes the jobseeker perspective, scholars often concentrate more on how jobseekers can use new technologies to enhance their ability *to search* (e.g., (Trusty et al., 2019)), rather than how they can enhance their ability *to be found*.

Whatever the reason for the prior lack of attention, my goal in this paper is to introduce QV and develop a model of labor search with QV at its center. I begin by defining and elaborating the QV concept, informed by visibility concepts previously developed by management and communication scholars. Then I describe the contextual focus of this study—the labor search process as it relates to staffing—and how this process is evolving due to emerging LMTs. Next, I draw on theories and concepts related to *visibility* (Brighenti, 2007); *signaling* (Celani & Singh, 2011; Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1978) and *strategic self-presentation* (Hogan, 2010; Leonardi & Treem, 2012) to model the antecedents, tensions, and consequences of QV. I explain how LMTs contribute to a general increase in QV, and then explore three paradoxical tensions in which certain aspects of these LMTs each promote visibility in one way but diminish it in another. These tensions pertain to the level of *crowding* on LMTs, the level of *application frictions* they impose, and the amount discretion for *strategic self-presentation* they allow. To complete my theorizing, I consider the consequences of QV in the context of labor search. In

---

<sup>1</sup> There is some work on visibility that arises from celebrity or star power (Terry et al., 2023), but it is not specifically aimed at visibility of qualifications. There is also a marketing literature pertaining to online personal branding (Labrecque et al., 2011), however, it is not centered on branding for the purpose of attracting employer attention during job search.

particular, I develop a formal proposition linking QV to the efficiency of labor search, and then offer some initial conjectures about the indirect consequences of QV operating *through* labor search as a mediating variable.

The central contributions of this paper are to: (1) define QV and elaborate its dimensionality, (2) delineate how it is magnified and shaped by LMTs, and (3) devise a theoretical model of labor search that places QV at its center. As I explain in the discussion section, these contributions have some compelling implications for future work by both visibility researchers and scholars interested in the influence of emerging LMTs on QV and labor search.

## **2. Visibility and Qualifications Visibility**

Scholars have shown increasing interest in the concept of *visibility* in organizations and society. Brighenti (2007) argues that visibility should be treated as a general conceptual category. Subsequent work has developed narrower concepts, including *information* visibility (Stohl et al., 2016), *communication* visibility (Leonardi, 2014; Treem et al., 2020), *behavior* visibility (Leonardi & Treem, 2020), *online* visibility (Lappas et al., 2016), and *digital* visibility (Brantner & Stehle, 2021; Rhue, 2014).

Continuing this line of work, I define qualifications visibility (QV) as the *ease with which salient actors can discover, access, and interpret a person's qualifications for particular jobs or tasks*. As with other definitions, my conception goes beyond the mere ability of some audience to physically observe qualifications—after all, it hardly matters if something can be seen in principle if it is too difficult to see in practice, or if seen, will not be understood or properly interpreted. The idea that visibility is tied to the *effort* a viewer must exert runs through Leonardi and Treem's body of work on visibility (Leonardi, 2014; Leonardi & Treem, 2012; Leonardi & Treem, 2020; Treem & Leonardi, 2013; Treem et al., 2020), and the work of other visibility scholars (Brantner & Stehle, 2021; Lappas et al., 2016).

As with other notions of visibility, my conceptualization is: (1) *context-specific*, (2) *inherently relational*, and (3) *multi-faceted*. I elaborate on these three elements below.

### **2.1 Visibility is Context-Specific**

For visibility to be useful in management research, it must be defined in relation to some context and its associated objects of visibility, such as people or things or information. While Brighenti has defined a general notion of visibility as a phenomenon that “lies at the intersection of aesthetics (relations of perception) and politics (relations of power)” (Brighenti, 2007, p. 324), scholars of management and communication have devised narrower definitions for specific categories of visibility (see Appendix A). In my case, the context is *labor search*, and the objects of visibility are representations of worker qualifications.

QV is, of course, anchored on the concept of qualifications. Here I define work qualifications (henceforth just “qualifications”) as *attributes of a person that determine their suitability to perform certain jobs or tasks in a particular work context*. These attributes include knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs), with the “other” category encompassing an individual's motivations, preferences, general behavioral tendencies, and character (Acikgoz, 2019; Campion et al., 2011; Heneman et al., 2019, p. 10; Ployhart, 2006). Qualifications are often linked to particular tasks, and that means a job's tasks largely determine which KSAOs an individual will need for that job. Qualifications also encompass facts about a person that permit inferences about their KSAOs, such as work history, work-related goals and desires, formal credentials, example work products, and observational records from interviews and pre-employment assessments (Phillips, 2023, Chapter 9; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Tippins, 2015).

While some qualifications can be observed directly, more often they are made visible through *representations* of various sorts, such as resumes or assessment results. These representations serve as containers for communicating particular subsets of a person's qualifications. The most important trend regarding QV is the increasing digitization of qualifications themselves, and digitization of the methods used to represent and assess them. In the analog era, qualifications were represented with printed resumes or other physical artifacts that were only accessible to people who had copies of those artifacts. However, platforms such as Indeed and LinkedIn now provide representations of resumes, recommendations, test scores, and so on (Brenner et al., 2020; Roulin & Levashina, 2019; Van Dijck, 2013). Work samples can now be stored and shared digitally. Emerging digital selection tools (see (Woods et al., 2020) for a review) automate both the interview process (Hickman et al., 2022; Lukacik et al., 2022) and the initial analysis of qualifications (Sajjadiani et al., 2019), and make the results available for viewing throughout the hiring organization (Feloni, 2017). Status markers (Levina & Arriaga, 2014) and the scores generated by various *reputation systems* (Kokkosis, 2021; Resnick et al., 2000; Tadelis, 2016) also serve as representations of qualifications, in that actions promoting a person's online reputation (such as for performing well in completing some task) will also usually provide evidence of qualifications (such as to perform such tasks in the future).

## **2.2 Visibility is *Inherently Relational***

Visibility is inherently *relational* (Brighenti, 2007; Leonardi & Treem, 2020; Treem et al., 2020), in that it links an audience of potential viewers to the things to be viewed. With QV, the things to be viewed are representations of qualifications. This relational linkage occurs on a *field of visibility*, which is a physical or virtual space that encompasses both the audience of viewers and the people or things to be viewed (Brighenti, 2007).

The audience depends on which context is salient. For qualifications, the relevant context is labor search and person-job matching (Caldwell & O'Reilly III, 1990; Edwards, 1991). The audience includes human recruiters and, increasingly, non-human actors, i.e., algorithms (Horton, 2017), which sometimes process qualifications that are hidden from human observers. For example, the matching algorithm used by one online labor market incorporates confidential ratings from employers that are not part of a worker's public profile (Rahman, 2021). Nevertheless, these otherwise hidden qualifications are indirectly visible to recruiters when those recruiters rely on the scores or ranked results produced by such algorithms.

## **2.3 Visibility is *Multifaceted***

A third key aspect of visibility is that it is multi-faceted and goes beyond the ability of some audience to physically observe certain objects of visibility. For example, Brantner and Stehle (2021) specify three levels of digital visibility: (1) being *noticeable* (i.e., the likelihood of being seen), (2) being heard or noticed (i.e., actually being seen), and (3) being respected or recognized (i.e., receiving one's fair share of visibility).

My definition incorporates three dimensions of visibility that are particularly relevant when matching people to jobs or tasks: *discoverability*, *accessibility*, and *interpretability*. Qualifications are more *discoverable* when actors can more easily find a worker when looking for people that have that worker's qualifications. They are more *accessible* when actors can more easily locate, retrieve, and process fuller details about workers once found. They are more *interpretable* when these details can be more accurately mapped to, and allow actors to make more valid inferences about, a person's KSAOs.

I further decompose discoverability into two subdimensions: *detectability* and *noticeability*. This creates the distinctions necessary to illuminate certain tensions associated with fields of visibility (to be explained later in Section 4.2). Qualifications are *detectable* when they appear on a field


of visibility that is viewable by salient actors. Visibility fields can be physical, such as the city streets in which Goffman (1971) studied the visible connections between urban dwellers. In my case, visibility fields are metaphorical. For example, 100 resumes stacked on a recruiter’s desk can be treated as a visibility field that connects one recruiter to 100 applicants. The presence of an applicant’s resume in this pile makes their qualifications detectable, but not necessarily noticeable. The visibility fields for qualifications are increasingly determined by LMTs (such as job boards), which connect an audience of recruiters to a set of jobseekers who have a presence on the LMT. In fact, these technologies create fields of *mass visibility*, where many thousands of individuals congregate.

Qualifications are *noticeable* to the extent that they are likely to draw the attention of salient actors that are scanning a field of visibility. Resumes at the bottom of a pile of 100 are less noticeable than those on the top even though they are equally detectable because of their presence in the pile. One of the tensions I develop later (in Section 4.2.1), is that as more jobseekers crowd onto a particular field of visibility constituted by an LMT (such as by applying for a job on a firm’s recruitment portal) this swells the ranks of people who are detectable, but each becomes less noticeable. While noticeability does feature in some prior conceptualizations of visibility (e.g., (Brantner & Stehle, 2021; Treem et al., 2020)), detectability does not.

To sum up, the QV dimensions identified above constitute a set of interconnected *visibility pathways* that a recruiter must walk if they are to fully *see* an individual and their qualifications. The journey begins with a walk down the detectability pathway, such as when a recruiter obtains access to a job board populated with qualifications data for a set of potential candidates. It continues along the noticeability pathway, when the recruiter enters search terms and scrutinizes the result set. Next comes the accessibility pathway, where the recruiter clicks through on certain individuals to see details about their qualifications. The journey concludes on the interpretability pathway, where the recruiter makes sense of these details with respect to the position to be filled.

### 3. A Theoretical Model of QV: Antecedents, Tensions, and Consequences

In the preceding sections I developed core ideas related to QV. Based on this foundation, I now present a model of the antecedents, tensions, and consequences of QV that integrates concepts related to *visibility* (Brantner & Stehle, 2021; Brighenti, 2007; Leonardi & Treem, 2020); *signaling* (Celani & Singh, 2011; Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1978) and *strategic self-presentation* (Goffman, 1959; Hogan, 2010; Leonardi & Treem, 2012) in the context of *labor search* (Autor, 2001; Rogerson et al., 2005) (see Figure 1 and Table 1).



**Figure 1. Theoretical Model**

I start by describing some pertinent aspects of the theoretical context. Then I examine how LMTs shape QV in general, and how this shaping depends on two LMT characteristics: scope and locus of control (P1). I then develop three propositions (P2a, P2b, and P2c) that reflect paradoxical tensions in the relationship between LMTs and QV. Next, I consider the consequences of QV in

the context of labor search. I develop a formal proposition directly linking QV to labor search efficiency (P3), and then identify some plausible indirect consequences of QV acting *through* labor search efficiency. While space limitations do not allow these indirect consequences to be formally theorized here, my initial conceptualization highlights opportunities for future work.

**Table 1: Construct Definitions**

<b>Construct</b>	<b>Definition</b>
<b>Labor Matching Technology (LMT)</b>	<i>Labor matching technologies</i> gather and store data on worker qualifications and make this data available to recruiters and hiring managers.
<b>Qualifications Visibility (QV)</b>	<i>Qualifications visibility</i> is the ease with which salient actors are able to discover, access, and interpret a person’s qualifications for particular jobs and tasks
<b>Discoverability</b>	Qualifications are <i>discoverable</i> to the extent salient actors can easily find representations of a worker’s qualifications. Discoverability has two subdimensions, <i>detectability</i> and <i>noticeability</i> .
<b>Detectability</b>	Qualifications are <i>detectable</i> when they appear on a field of visibility that encompasses salient actors. (Detectability is a subdimension of discoverability.)
<b>Noticeability</b>	Qualifications are <i>noticeable</i> to the extent they draw the attention of salient actors when scanning a field of visibility. (Noticeability is a subdimension of discoverability.)
<b>Accessibility</b>	Qualifications are <i>accessible</i> to the extent salient actors can easily locate, retrieve, and process fuller details about qualifications once found.
<b>Interpretability</b>	Qualifications are <i>interpretable</i> to the extent these details can be accurately mapped to, and allow salient actors to make more valid inferences about, a person’s knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics (KSAOs).
<b>Field of Visibility</b>	A <i>field of visibility</i> is a bounded physical or virtual space which connects some objects of visibility (people or things) to a set of potential viewers (people or algorithms). LMTs create fields of visibility.
<b>Crowding</b>	<i>Crowding</i> on a visibility field occurs when a large number of people cram or flock onto the field.
<b>Application Frictions</b>	<i>Application frictions</i> refer to elements of the application process that increase the time or resources people must devote to learning about whether the other party is application-worthy, and then completing the application process itself.
<b>Discretion for Strategic Self-Presentation</b>	<i>Discretion for strategic self-presentation</i> refers to the extent to which individuals can shape representations of their qualifications in ways that they believe will best advance their occupational goals, with this shaping ranging from selective disclosures, to minor exaggerations, to major falsifications.
<b>Labor Search Efficiency</b>	<i>Labor search (LS) efficiency</i> is the inverse of the level of resources needed to find, assess, and acquire a qualified and interested worker for a particular job or task.


### 3.1 Theoretical Context: Staffing and Labor Search in the Digital Age

This study focuses on labor search as it relates to organizational staffing. Staffing is concerned with three main activities: hiring, deployment, and retention (Heneman et al., 2019, p. 10; Ployhart, 2006). Labor search features directly in the first two of these activities, and indirectly in the third, in that labor search can be triggered by a retention failure.

Hiring is a process of labor search that unfolds over a set of stages. These include *sourcing* (deciding where to recruit and locating potential leads), *recruitment* (publicizing open positions and encouraging individuals to apply), *assessment* (putting applicants through interviews, skills tests, etc., that enable an evaluation of their qualifications), *selection* (using qualifications and

other data to decide who is the best fit), and *acquisition* (filling the position) (Phillips, 2023, p. 9). Hired individuals are then *deployed*, i.e., assigned to their initial jobs and tasks, and then guided through subsequent movements to new ones.

In the practitioner literature, these stages are often depicted as a *funnel* (e.g., (Holmes, 2019)). Many candidates enter the process (represented by the wide end of the funnel), but at each stage some get winnowed out until just a few emerge with job offers (see Figure 1). Most funnel depictions assume the recruiter is trying to hire a new full-time employee. However, the same stages apply—albeit with some modification—to two other hiring scenarios: *internal hiring* (i.e., using existing employees to fill open positions (Phillips, 2023, Chp. 10)), and hiring *gig workers* (Aguinis & Lawal, 2013)).



**Figure 1. The Hiring Funnel<sup>2</sup>**

### 3.1.1 Labor Matching

A general process of *labor matching* lies at the center of the external, internal, and gig hiring scenarios. Many benefits flow from effective matches for individuals (e.g., higher job satisfaction), employers (e.g., a more productive and stable workforce), and the economy as a whole (e.g., more efficient allocation of labor) (Barrick & Parks-Leduc, 2019; Caldwell & O'Reilly III, 1990; Weller et al., 2019).

Of particular interest here is *person-job matching*, which Heneman (2019, p. 6) has argued is foundational not just to the hiring process, but to *all* staffing activities. A similar perspective is taken in (Weller et al., 2019). The primary goal of person-job matching is the creation of high-quality matches, i.e., the placement of people into jobs for which they are well-suited owing to high *person-job fit* (Caldwell & O'Reilly III, 1990; Edwards, 1991) and high *person-organization fit* (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). More specifically, a high-quality match is one in which the qualifications and motivations of a person are well-aligned with the requirements and rewards of the job<sup>3</sup> (Edwards, 1991; Heneman et al., 2019, p. 18).

After individuals have been hired, managerial attention turns to staff *deployment*, which encompasses the placement of new hires into their initial job roles and their subsequent movement through the organization into new roles, projects, and tasks (Bidwell, 2020; Heneman et al., 2019, p. 10). The latter facet of deployment often involves labor search and matching,

<sup>2</sup> The specific stages depicted here are based on those described in (Phillips, 2023, Chp. 10).

<sup>3</sup> Here I use job to refer to any aggregation of work, ranging from roles, to specific projects, assignments, or tasks, whether they be performed by regular full-time employees, gig workers, or other kinds of non-standard workers (Cappelli & Keller, 2013; Cascio & Boudreau, 2017).

because an internal employee’s move to a new role is usually enabled by the existence of a manager somewhere looking for a person like them.

### 3.1.2 Digitized Qualifications and Labor Matching Technologies

As with digital platforms more generally (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2019), most labor matching technologies (LMTs) perform two basic functions: facilitating matching and improving transaction efficiency. I define an LMT as *any platform or technology relevant to labor search that gathers and stores data on worker qualifications and makes this data available to recruiters and hiring managers* (Table 2 describes a dozen kinds of LMT.) I highlight the term *matching* because their matching function is most salient to this paper, although many of them do much more than match candidates to jobs. For example, online labor markets also enable clients to collaborate with, monitor, and pay gig workers (Agrawal et al., 2015).

Some LMTs are *public* while others are *firm-specific*. *Public* platforms are operated by intermediaries to facilitate matchmaking between a general population of employers and a general population of workers. These technologies include *traditional job boards* (Bonet et al., 2013; Nakamura et al., 2009), *comprehensive job boards* (Autor, 2009; Bagues & Labini, 2009), *professional social networking sites* (SNS) (Bonet et al., 2013; Roulin & Levashina, 2019), *people aggregator sites* (Phillips, 2023, p. 221), *credential networks* (Nietzel, 2020), and *online labor markets* (Agrawal et al., 2015; Constantinides et al., 2018; Kokkodis, 2021).<sup>4</sup>

**Table 2: Labor Matching Technologies**

Type	Description
<b>Traditional Job Boards</b>	<b>Job boards</b> (e.g., ZipRecruiter, Indeed) allow employers to list jobs and search for workers. Jobseekers create profiles, list qualifications, search for jobs, and submit applications (Bonet et al., 2013; Nakamura et al., 2009).
<b>Comprehensive Job Boards</b>	<b>Comprehensive job boards</b> (e.g., AlmaLaurea) resemble regular job boards, except <i>all</i> members of a given population are <i>automatically</i> added by some authority based on the administrative records they possess or have acquired (Bagues & Labini, 2009). For example, AlmaLaurea provides “the university equivalent of open records for job applicants: a college transcript, a class ranking, and, implicitly, a comparison of each applicant to his or her immediate peers” (Autor, 2009, p. 7).
<b>People Aggregator Sites</b>	<b>People aggregator sites</b> (e.g., Pandologic, TalentBin) use web-crawlers to scrape qualifications and other personal data from public sources (e.g., social media sites, employer profile pages) and make that available to clients (Black & van Esch, 2020; Phillips, 2023, p. 221).
<b>Professional SNS</b>	<b>Professional SNS</b> (e.g., LinkedIn, ResearchGate) were originally created to allow people to establish connections for work-related purposes (Bonet et al., 2013), but now also serve as a resource for discovery of passive job seekers. Some also offer matching services similar to job boards.
<b>Credential Networks</b>	<b>Credential networks</b> (e.g., VLF’s Velocity Network) let individuals securely store and share <i>validated credentials</i> (i.e., degrees, licenses, certifications, badges) that have been <i>verified by the grantors of the credentials</i> . The Velocity Network supports a self-sovereign identity (SSI) model, meaning individuals control how their data is kept and used (Lacity & Carmel, 2022; Nietzel, 2020).

<sup>4</sup> I omit general SNS and other forms of social media from this list because their purpose is not to promote person-job matching, even though recruiters do increasingly scrutinize information about candidates on these platforms, despite much controversy over whether they *should* do this (Landers & Schmidt, 2016; Roth et al., 2016).



<b>Online Labor Markets</b>	<b>Online labor markets</b> (e.g., Upwork, Freelancer) match external gig workers to employers that have tasks to complete (Agrawal et al., 2015; Constantinides et al., 2018; Kokkodis, 2021). Employers create task specifications, list necessary qualifications, conduct searches, and then hire and monitor gig workers. Gig workers create profiles, designate qualifications, and then search and apply for jobs.
<b>Talent Acquisition Suites</b>	<b>Talent acquisition suites</b> (i.e., Greenhouse, IBM Kenexa) support all aspects of the hiring process for an employer, including managing connections to job boards, marketing and brand management, pre-hire skills assessments and psychological testing, online candidate interviews, candidate scoring, background checks, and applicant tracking (Bersin, 2017). These suites serve as a hub that combines candidate data gathered from external sites (e.g., job boards) with data directly solicited from applicants (e.g., via application blanks, questionnaires, and tests).
<b>Recruitment Portals</b>	<b>Recruitment portals</b> are used by employers to promote their employment brands, list open positions (Baum & Kabst, 2014), connect candidates to digital selection tools (e.g., application blanks, psychometric testing, asynchronous video interviews (Woods et al., 2020)), and feed data to other platforms (e.g., talent acquisition suites and talent communities) (Heneman et al., 2019, p. 232).
<b>Talent Communities</b>	<b>Talent communities</b> (e.g., PwC Talent Community) allow employers to build and curate a collection of high-potential future job candidates that the firm would like to stay connected to (Phillips, 2023). Individuals self-select or get invited to apply, then are screened for eligibility to join the community. Member profiles are housed in a stand-alone platform or added to a talent acquisition suite (Phillips, 2023, p. 245-6; PwC, 2023).
<b>Talent Exchanges</b>	<b>Talent exchanges</b> (e.g., Washington Post, PwC) house a collection of pre-qualified freelancers. As with talent communities, individuals apply for membership by communicating details about their qualifications and interests, and get screened to determine eligibility to join the exchange.
<b>Talent Management Suites</b>	<b>Talent management suites</b> (e.g., Oracle, Workday, SAP) provide modules for employee development, career planning, retention, and internal mobility (Heneman et al., 2019, p. 519). They store an employee's general profile (similar to a resume) and accumulate details about the individual's experiences at the firm (e.g., learning and development activities, work assignments, performance evaluations).
<b>Internal Talent Marketplaces</b>	<b>Internal talent marketplaces</b> (e.g., Gloat, Fuel50, Eightfold) allow organizations to create an internal, on-demand market that is similar to an online labor market, except they are targeted at current employees of the firm. These platforms match standard workers to discretionary gigs to be completed in addition to their regular job duties. They also connect internal gig workers to their next assignment (Fuller et al., 2020; Kiron et al., 2020).

By contrast, *firm-specific* LMTs are operated by particular firms to facilitate the hiring of new workers, and the matching of existing workers to jobs within that firm. These include web-based *recruitment portals* (Baum & Kabst, 2014), which among other things serve as a hub for digital selection procedures (Woods et al., 2020); *talent acquisition suites* (Bersin, 2017); *talent communities* (Phillips, 2023, p. 245-6; PwC, 2023); *talent exchanges* (Friess, 2017; King & Ockels, 2016); *talent management suites* (Heneman et al., 2019, p. 519); and *internal talent marketplaces* (Bryan et al., 2006; Fuller et al., 2020; Kiron et al., 2020; Malone, 2004).

Having just elaborated key elements of the theoretical context, I now turn to the development of theoretical propositions, starting with one that links LMTs to QV.

### 3.2 How Labor Matching Technologies Promote QV

In general, LMTs increase the visibility of qualifications by promoting each of the three dimensions of QV (see Table 3). For example, by adding their qualifications to LinkedIn, a person makes them visible, in principle, to any of the 50 million or so weekly visitors to this

platform. As with other LMTs, LinkedIn aggregates evidence of KSAOs for pools of individuals who possess various qualifications, and then makes it possible to find, from within these pools, those who possess the qualifications a recruiter needs. However, just because there are many visitors in a given week who *could* view a certain profile, that does not mean anyone actual *will* view it. I included the qualifiers *ease* and *salient* in my definition of discoverability to highlight that it is not just the theoretical ability to be discovered that matters with respect to visibility but the *ease* of discovery, and not just by anyone, but by *salient* actors, such as those recruiters with an open position that plausibly fits a person’s qualifications. Furthermore, these qualifications must be easy to *access* and *interpret* if recruiters are to make effective use of search and filtering tools to support accurate judgements about fit.

**Table 3: How LMTs Promote QV**

<b>QV Dimension</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Discoverability</b>	Recruiters can use key word filtering and matching algorithms to identify and screen potential and actual job candidates. For public LMTs these candidates will be external, while for firm-specific LMTs these candidates can be external, internal, or a member of the firm’s talent community or talent exchange. Recruiters can arrange to receive push notifications on actual or potential jobseekers who meet pre-defined criteria.
<b>Accessibility</b>	Recruiters have drill-down options on candidates they discover. Also, they can solicit additional data through application blanks, skills testing, AI-enhanced video interviews, and other means. Employer-solicited data creates an augmented record of an individual’s qualifications that goes beyond what they might choose to put on their resume or job board profile.
<b>Interpretability</b>	Most public and firm-specific LMTs enhance interpretability through the use of classification schemes for structured data, and text mining for unstructured data. Many of them—particularly firm-specific platforms—also enhance interpretability by augmenting applicant-volunteered data with data solicited or otherwise acquired by the platform owner.

Although LMTs share certain similarities per Table 3, they also have notable differences. For example, details regarding a person’s work history will only be *accessible* on platforms that store such history, such as online labor markets and internal talent markeplaces. Qualifications will be more *interpretable* on platforms where third parties provide validation, such as credential networks. In the next section, I drill down further on LMT differences, and analyze variations pertaining to: (1) *scope* of use in the hiring process, and (2) *locus of control* over QV.

### 3.2.1 LMT Variations Pertaining to the Scope of Use in Hiring

Table 4 identifies LMT characteristics that influence their scope of use. To keep things simple, I use binary contrasts, starting with whether they are public vs. firm-specific, and then whether the kind of hiring they intend to serve is for external vs. internal candidates, active vs. passive candidates, and standard vs. gig candidates. (When an LMT is roughly balanced between two end points I check both columns.) Below I consider these contrasts and how they shape QV.

Public LMTs obviously have a wider scope of use than firm-specific LMTs. They create a utility that is open (in principle) to any recruiter and worker, rather than just those linked to a single firm. As a result, public LMTs generally do more than firm-specific LMTs to enhance the discoverability dimension of QV.

The focus of hiring also matters. Public LMTs promote the visibility of *external* workers, while firm-specific LMTs usually target both external and internal workers, albeit for only one firm. Professional SNS and people aggregators expand visibility into *passive* job candidates, which greatly outnumber *active* candidates. Most LMTs focus on *standard workers* (i.e., full-time employees of the firm to be retained for an indefinite duration), but some focus on gig workers

that perform a one-off task. To sum up, an LMT’s scope of use in hiring influences which populations of potential job candidates are made visible to which recruiters.

**Table 4: LMT Scope**

Category	Public/Firm		Focus of Hiring					
	Public	Firm-specific	External	Internal	Active	Passive	Standard	Gig
Traditional Job Boards	√		√		√		√	
Comprehensive Job Boards	√		√		√		√	
People Aggregator Sites	√		√			√	√	
Professional SNS	√		√			√	√	
Credential Networks	√		√		√	√	√	
Online Labor Markets	√		√		√			√
Talent Acquisition Suites		√	√		√	√	√	
Recruitment Portals		√	√		√		√	
Talent Communities		√	√			√	√	
Talent Exchanges		√	√		√	√		√
Talent Management Suites		√		√	√	√	√	
Internal Talent Marketplaces		√		√	√			√

### 3.2.2 LMT Variations Pertaining to Locus of Control Over QV

Another key variation is whether the *locus of control* over QV resides primarily with LMT operators, with the individuals themselves, or is roughly balanced between both parties. For public LMTs those operators are labor market intermediaries (Bonet et al., 2013) standing between jobseekers and employers, while for firm-specific LMTs they are a single employer.

There are three facets to this control: (1) whether an individual will have a *presence* on an LMT, and when they do, (2) what the *extent* of qualifications data to be stored on the LMT will be, and (3) what data will be made *accessible* to which audiences. Table 5 illustrates how the locus of control varies across these three facets for different LMTs.

On the first facet, primary control over LMT presence can reside with the LMT operator, or with individuals, or can be roughly balance between the two. Increasing operator control over presence reduces the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard (Autor, 2009; Liu et al., 2021), which, in turn, promotes the interpretability dimension of QV. It can also greatly increase the potential number of jobseekers who are discoverable, such as when LMT operators add individuals *en masse* (as in the case of aggregators.)

On the second facet, data extent can be limited to what is volunteered by individuals, or it can include data solicited or created by LMT operators (i.e., employers or public LMT owners). Employers have long used application forms, job interviews, testing, etc., to solicit data to supplement candidate-supplied data. Digitization has increased the efficiency of data collection, which may explain the resurgence of interest in pre-employment testing (Cappelli, 2019). Public LMT operators can also exert control over data extent. They can gain wholesale access to institutional records, as in the case of comprehensive job board AlmaLaurea. They can obtain data from public sources, such as when aggregators scrape data from public sites or access government databases.<sup>5</sup> They can empower third parties to contribute data, such as when LinkedIn allows endorsements on specific skills possessed by a worker.

<sup>5</sup> ProQuest Pivot, which hosts a presence for over three million scholars scraped from profile pages and digitized CVs appearing on university websites, provides an interesting example that combines aspects of comprehensive job boards and aggregator sites.

**Table 5. Locus of Control Over Platform Presence, Data Extent and Data Access**

LMT Type	Locus of Control Resides Primarily with LMT Operators or Individuals or is Balanced for:		
	Platform Presence	Qualifications Data Extent	Qualifications Data Access
<b>Traditional Job Boards</b>	<b>Individuals:</b> People decide whether to create a presence.	<b>Individuals:</b> People create profiles and list qualifications. Employers may solicit additional data during applicant screening.	<b>Individuals:</b> People designate whether their profiles are available to all, or only selected employers.
<b>Comprehensive Job Boards</b>	<b>LMT Operators:</b> The platform operator unilaterally creates a presence for a set of individuals.	<b>LMT Operators:</b> The operator decides what data to host, although it usually must enlist other institutions (e.g., universities) to supply the data.	<b>LMT Operators:</b> The operator determines who has access to what data.
<b>People Aggregator Sites</b>	<b>LMT Operators:</b> The operator unilaterally decides which individuals to gather data about. While some aggregators allow people to opt out in principle, in practice very few are aware they are being aggregated or that they can opt out.	<b>LMT Operators:</b> The operator decides what data to host, conditioned on what third parties have made available to aggregate.	<b>LMT Operators:</b> The operator determines who has access to what data.
<b>Professional SNS</b>	<b>Balanced:</b> While people decide whether to create a presence, evolving norms can create substantial pressure to have a presence on some platforms, such as LinkedIn.	<b>Individuals:</b> People craft their profiles and list qualifications, and some make public posts. Colleagues can offer skills endorsements, but individuals are empowered to delete them.	<b>Individuals:</b> People decide what data to include in their profile, which also determines how discoverable they will be via search engines.
<b>Credential Networks</b>	<b>Individuals:</b> People decide whether to create a presence, but if credential networks become sufficiently popular, individuals could have the same pressure to create a presence that they have now on some professional SNS.	<b>Balanced:</b> People create profiles and list qualifications. The operator together with third parties validate certain credentials.	<b>Individuals:</b> People are empowered to choose who will have access, especially on those networks supporting the self-sovereign identity model.
<b>Online Labor Markets</b>	<b>Individuals:</b> People decide whether to create a presence.	<b>LMT Operators:</b> Operators store work history, client comments and ratings, and create reputation scores. People create profiles and list qualifications.	<b>LMT Operators:</b> The operator determines what qualifications data is explicitly available through search and filtering, and implicitly through algorithms.
<b>Talent Acquisition Suites</b> <b>Recruitment Portals</b>	<b>Balanced:</b> People decide whether to apply, but could be pre-screened and prevented from creating a presence by the employer. Employers can unilaterally add a presence for passive candidates they have discovered.	<b>Balanced:</b> People contribute resumes (possibly firm-specific) and/or LinkedIn profiles; Employers solicit data through application blanks, testing, interviews, etc.	<b>LMT Operators:</b> The employer decides who within the firm can access this data at each stage of the hiring funnel.

<b>Talent Communities</b>	<b>Balanced:</b> Individuals decide whether to apply, but could be pre-screened by the employer.	<b>Balanced:</b> Similar to talent acquisition suites, except people also pre-define which types of positions or gigs most interest them should they become available in the future.	
<b>Talent Exchanges</b>			
<b>Talent Management Suites</b>	<b>LMT Operators:</b> Most employers unilaterally add all employees, but in principle could offer an opt-out provision.	<b>Balanced:</b> Employees usually populate and maintain their own profiles. The employer may choose to automatically populate data about work activities and job performance.	<b>LMT Operators:</b> Access is usually determined by the employer, though they may choose to grant employees some control.
<b>Internal Talent Marketplaces</b>			

LMT operators can also generate primary data themselves. For example, online labor markets retain a detailed history for each worker, including the number of jobs completed, what those jobs were, all on-platform communications, and public and private ratings by clients. Much of this history is made visible to potential employers explicitly or implicitly by using it in algorithms. LMT operators can also use algorithms to generate new data, including reputation scores and match scores pertaining to specific jobs (Kokkodis, 2021). As with reputation scores in other domains (Dellarocas, 2006; Tadelis, 2016), those on online labor markets seek to assure clients that job candidates are generally capable and trustworthy.<sup>6</sup>

Increasing LMT operator control over data extent will reduce information asymmetry, which should enhance the interpretability dimension of QV by reducing the discretion for strategic self-presentation (more on this in Section 4.2.3). It also gives LMT operators discretion to acquire data that is more interpretable, such as by using a classification system.

Regarding the third facet, primary control over data access can reside with the individual, such as on a credentials network that supports the self-sovereign identify model, or with the LMT operator, as it does with aggregator sites, comprehensive job boards, and all firm-specific LMTs.

To summarize, while the general effect of LMTs is to increase QV, this claim elides important details about the specific mechanisms involved and how they vary across LMTs. I have highlighted many of these details in the text and tables supplied above. Table 3 summarizes some commonalities across LMTs in how they promote QV dimensions, but Tables 4 and 5 delineate differences in their scope of use in hiring and the locus of control over QV, respectively. Based on the above, I propose that:

**Proposition 1.** *LMTs increase QV for a set of potential workers to an audience of potential recruiters, but the extent to which this occurs will vary depending on the LMT’s scope of use in hiring and the level of LMT operator control over QV.*


### 3.3 Paradoxical Tensions in the LMT→QV Relationship

Paradoxical tensions abound in the visibility literature. Stohl et al. (2016) theorize a *transparency paradox* in which some organizations increase visibility of information in ways that actually thwart transparency by creating *opacity*. Leonardi et al. (2020) revisit the transparency paradox and highlight two more: a *connectivity paradox* (in which efforts to increase connections among workers results in overcommunication, interruptions and interference), and a *performance paradox* (in which the highest performers may have the least

<sup>6</sup> Reputation is often represented by simple metrics, such extent of work completed and average quality ratings given by prior clients, but more complex metrics that draw on a variety of data can also be used (Rahman, 2021).

time or inclination to make their good performance visible to others). Watson et al. (2023) describe an *information compression* paradox, where adding data that has low variation to a decision process actually reduces the amount of useful information. An emerging literature investigates a *hypervisibility/(in)visibility* paradox in which members of marginalized groups are prone to be excessively visibility in terms of negative scrutiny, but insufficiently visible in terms of positive recognition (Settles et al., 2019).

Continuing in this vein, I consider three paradoxical tensions pertaining to the effects of LMTs on QV (Figure 3). In all three cases the paradox arises because some factor connected to LMTs increase QV in one way but diminish it in another.



**Figure 3: Paradoxical Tensions in the LMT→QV Relationship**

### 3.3.1 Crowding on the Field of Visibility

*“And when I’m old and I’ve had my fun, I’ll sell my inventions so that everyone can be superheroes. Everyone can be super! And when everyone’s super... no one will be.” – Syndrome, the villain from Pixar’s The Incredibles.*

LMTs connect recruiters and jobseekers on a *field of visibility*: Individuals enter a visibility field when they have a presence on an LMT, and recruiters become observers on a visibility field when they gain access to an LMT. Recruiters manifest a job-specific *visibility field segment* when they use screening tools to determine which subset of the people on the visibility field will be considered for a particular position. *Crowding* on a visibility field occurs when a large number of people flock onto the field.

The many active and passive jobseekers now flocking onto LMTs account for the general rise in QV. For example, nearly 250 million people have a presence on Indeed. Anecdotal reports (see (Black & van Esch, 2020) suggest that employers have seen dramatic surges in applications received through their recruitment portals and other digital channels. These applications are then used to populate profiles on various firm-specific LMTs.

This increased crowding on LMTs no doubt arises from many causes, including the increased use of public LMTs by employers (which creates positive cross-side network effects that encourage further adoption by individuals), and the digitization of the application process on firm-specific LMTs (which decreases application frictions). Increased crowding can also happen when two platforms merge.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For example, Li and Netessin (2020) show that when two peer-to-peer holiday rental platforms merged this created search frictions that reduced match rates.

Regardless of why it happens, crowding matters because of its paradoxical effect on visibility. As with the superpowers referenced in the quote above—which are by definition powers that exceed some normal baseline—visibility also has a relative quality. Imagine a field of visibility in the form of a football stadium. If a single tuba player stands alone at the 50-yard line, they will be highly visible to an observer perched up in the stands. Now imagine this tuba player is just one of a 1000 spaced out on the field. Even if our observer still has an unobscured line of sight, the original tuba player will be effectively invisible under this revised scenario.<sup>8</sup>

It is not a new idea that something can be perfectly visible in principle but effectively invisible in practice. Experiments have shown that *banner blindness* negates the influence of online banner ads (Benway, 1998) and *inattention blindness* can hide a gorilla in our midst (Drew et al., 2013). While the basic idea that something can be “hiding in plain sight” is not new, the specific mechanisms involved will vary depending on the context. I elaborate those mechanisms now to analyze the paradoxical effects of crowding on a field of visibility, and then formulate an associated proposition.

Earlier I specified that qualifications were *discoverable* to the extent *salient* actors can easily find representations of a worker’s qualifications. What makes an actor *salient* is that they are seeking to fill a position for which the focal worker is plausibly qualified. I also decomposed discoverability into *detectability* and *noticeability*, and stated that qualifications are detectable when they appear on a field of visibility that is viewable by salient actors, and are noticeable to the extent they are likely to draw the attention of salient actors that are searching a field of visibility.

While noticeability is prominent in some prior conceptualizations of visibility (Brantner & Stehle, 2021; Brighenti, 2007; Treem et al., 2020) detectability is not. Detectability is necessary for noticeability, but not sufficient. Our tuba player is equally detectable per my definition whether alone or in a crowd of 1000, but they are much less noticeable in the latter situation. Put another way, our tuba player was *ostensibly* visible in the crowd of 1000 but not *materially* visible, due to crowding on the field of visibility.

To summarize the above, an important element of material visibility is standing out from the crowd, but as the crowd grows—i.e., as more people become detectable and therefore ostensibly visible—it is increasingly difficult for any one individual to stand out from the crowd and be noticed.<sup>9</sup> Stated formally:

***Proposition 2a.*** *Crowding on the field of visibility created by an LMT increases visibility for a set of individuals through the detectability pathway, but decreases visibility of any particular individual through the noticeability pathway.*

### 3.3.2 Application Frictions and Signals of Quality and Intent

*“We are not interested in simply seeing our application numbers grow,” Mahoney said. “We are interested in attracting more serious, intentional applicants to Boston College who see themselves as a good fit for the University.” – Boston College Admissions director John Mahoney, commenting on the 25% reduction in applications triggered by the addition of an essay requirement (Dunn, 2013).*

---

<sup>8</sup> Note that while in this example there is a limited physical space, that is not a requirement for crowding. Birds can flock in an essentially unlimited sky, and people can flock in an essentially unlimited LMT.

<sup>9</sup> For example, Leonardi and Treem observed that “as entries into the [knowledge management] system increase, individuals face the risk that each presentation of knowledge becomes relatively less visible — that the stage of knowledge performances becomes more crowded.” (Leonardi & Treem, 2012, p. 56).

While classic economic models assume search frictions away, these frictions occupy a central position in search theory (Chade et al., 2017; Rogerson et al., 2005). A search friction is anything that raises the cost of finding and/or learning about something an individual or firm wants, such as a product to buy, a person to date, college to attend, or an employee to hire. Application frictions are a category of search friction that arise when an actor must first apply for permission to engage in a transaction. These frictions include the time and resources to learn if the other party is application-worthy and then to complete the application process itself, such as by filling out forms, writing essays, or paying fees (Knight & Schiff, 2022; Smith et al., 2015).

Application frictions—as with search frictions more generally—are undesirable because they reduce the efficiency of labor search, resulting in negative downstream consequences, such as increased time to fill open positions and frictional unemployment (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2019; Rogerson et al., 2005). It seems self-evident that employers should want to remove frictions that might discourage applications, especially given how much they invest in attracting applicants in the first place. The digitization of the job application process (as facilitated by certain LMTs) has indeed lowered these frictions in many ways. Online applications are easier than applying in person, and using a job board to automatically apply is easier still.

While the straightforward theoretical effect of reducing application frictions is to increase application rates (Knight & Schiff, 2022), I could find no studies that examine the actual effects of different kinds of application frictions on job application rates. However, there are such studies in the education market, where public data exists on whether and when schools adopt certain application policies that shift application frictions up or down. For example, Knight and Schiff (2022), found that schools adopting the common application—a mechanism explicitly intended to lower application frictions—did see increased application rates, and Smith et al. found that small changes in application essays and application fees had “sizeable effects on applications and enrollment” (2015, p. 17).

Despite the advantages of lower frictions just discussed, there may be a subtle cost to reducing them too far, having to do with the value of *signals* (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1978). In particular, the willingness of a person to endure a costly application process can be interpreted as a positive signal of their self-assessed quality and intent toward the firm (Spence, 2002). This reasoning is apparent in the lead-in quote for this section, where Mahoney implies that they were using the new essay requirement to better discern which applicants were “more serious” about attending and saw themselves as “a good fit for the university,” even if that meant shrinking the overall applicant pool.

In canonical signaling theory, signals arise in situations of asymmetric information, where one party has private information that is not available to the other. In fact, “signaling theory is fundamentally concerned with reducing information asymmetry between two parties” (Connelly et al., 2011, p. 40). A signal is an indicator of an entity’s unobservable characteristics, usually quality or intent (Stiglitz, 2000), that is freely given, and is credible because only an entity that actually possesses the underlying characteristic would also have the signal, usually because it is too costly for those who do not possess the characteristic to acquire the signal (Spence, 1978).

Signaling theory has been appropriated by scholars in many contexts, including strategic management, entrepreneurship, and human resources (Connelly et al., 2011). However, Spence’s original logic was devised in the context of labor search. Spence’s formulation took the individual-as-signaler perspective, however subsequent work in human resources has almost exclusively taken the firm-as-signaler perspective (Celani & Singh, 2011; Connelly et al., 2011; Taj, 2016), perhaps because it connects more directly to levers for managerial action. That is because managers have more control over the signals they send to attract jobseekers than they do over the signals they receive from them. Even so, Celani and Singh have called for a rebalancing



of scholarly attention: “There is a need, however, for research from the [individual-as-signaler] perspective. That is, how does the organization read signals from applicants?” (Celani & Singh, 2011, p. 232). The rise of LMTs creates a corresponding rise in the ability of employers to manage the signals they receive from applicants.

As noted, most signals map to a signaler’s quality or intent, both of which matter in the context of labor search. The quality of a jobseeker, such as determined by the apparent level of person-job and person-organization fit, is obviously crucial. Firms want to avoid receiving applications from individuals with low self-assessed fit to avoid the risk that such candidates—when they actually are low fit—will make it past early screens. However, intent is also crucial. People with a low intent to join the firm obviously waste recruiter resources—but even worse, their continued presence in the funnel can displace higher intent candidates. Also, if a low-intent candidate makes it to the offer stage, the elapse of time while they have the offer in hand can close the window of opportunity for hiring an alternative high-intent candidate.

Because the willingness to endure a costly application process creates a positive signal of self-assessed fit and intent, there could be situations when firms should intentionally raise application frictions, as Boston College did with the essay requirement. Even though this tactic will reduce the number of applications—or to put this in the terminology of visibility, it will reduce the number of people who chose to enter the field of visibility—it will also result in a pool of candidates with qualifications that are more *interpretable* because their willingness to apply becomes a more credible signal of self-assessed fit and intent.

To sum up the above, applications frictions are negative in the sense that the costs they impose will keep some candidates from applying, which reduces ostensible visibility through the detectability pathway. However, they are positive in the sense that they help to preserve the signal of intent and self-assessed fit that is associated with a willingness on the part of jobseekers to persist in a costly process, which increases material visibility (among those who do persist) through the interpretability pathway. Stated formally:

***Proposition 2b.*** *Application frictions on an LMT decrease visibility through the detectability pathway, but to the extent they create credible signals of quality and intent they increase visibility through the interpretability pathway.*

### **3.3.3 Discretion for Strategic Self-Presentation**

*“Shaping and managing visibility is a huge work that human beings do tirelessly.” – (Brighenti, 2007, p. 325)*

People have always understood the importance of managing the impressions that others have of them in order to gain their good opinion (Goffman, 1959). In the pre-digital era, most impression management happened face-to-face, but digital technologies now mediate self-presentation (Hogan, 2010; Leonardi & Treem, 2012). Particularly relevant here is *strategic self-presentation* in relation to work qualifications (Leonardi & Treem, 2012). Strategic self-presentation refers to situations where individuals shape representations of their qualifications in ways that they believe will best advance their occupational goals, with this shaping ranging from selective disclosure, to minor exaggerations, to major falsifications. Individuals know they may be selected into their next job or work assignment based on qualifications made visible through digital technologies, and so are motivated to be strategic in how they manage QV.

Goffman uses the metaphor of a stage play to explain how individuals present idealized versions of themselves in everyday life (Goffman, 1959; Hogan, 2010). Adopting Goffman’s dramaturgical approach, Leonardi and Treem (2012) argued that knowledge management technologies served as a stage on which technical support personnel enacted strategic

performances of expertise. In particular, individuals tended to portray their expertise in ways that would lead to desirable future work assignments and avoid undesirable ones.

Despite its popularity, Hogan (2010) has questioned the use of Goffman's stage play metaphor with respect to an individual's online presence, and has suggested an *art exhibition* as an alternative metaphor. In particular, Hogan argued the need to distinguish between digitally-mediated *performances*, which take place during synchronous *situations*, and digital *artifacts*, which exist as asynchronous *exhibitions*. While a stage play is a good metaphor for the former, an art exhibition is more apt for the latter. Hogan notes that an art exhibition is persistent and is mediated by a *curator*, which in the digital world is usually the operator of an online platform. The curator has considerable control over what artifacts are exhibited and how. This contrasts with the stage play metaphor, where the performance is ephemeral and takes place as a direct, synchronous encounter between the individual and a known audience.

With regard to qualifications, LMTs not only provide an exhibition space, but empower the platform operator to act in the role of a curator that shapes the audience's experience of a person's qualifications. For public LMTs, the operator is a match-making intermediary. For firm-specific platforms, it is a particular employer.

Earlier (in Table 5) I specified how LMTs differ in the locus of control for QV. It is natural for individuals to want to retain control over QV so as to maximize their discretion for acting strategically in how they represent their qualifications. Resume inflation is a well-known practice (Autor, 2009), and the opposite situation, where individuals act strategically to hide certain qualifications in order to dodge enlistment into tasks they view as unattractive is not unknown (Leonardi & Treem, 2012). By presenting themselves in the best possible light on an LMT, candidates hope to increase their chances of getting past initial recruiter screens. Put another way, they hope to increase their chances of getting into the visibility field segments manifested by recruiters, and to appear as prominently as possible in these segments. In so doing, they preserve and enhance their *noticeability*.

Despite the fact that jobseekers think they can—and in many cases probably actually can—make themselves more noticeable through strategic action, it is arguably in the best interest of the majority of jobseekers for LMT operators to have more control and to use it to limit the discretion for strategic action in order to improve *interpretability*. A few examples illustrate how LMT operator control promotes interpretability in this way. Starting with a simple one, credential networks (Nietzel, 2020) counter strategic behavior and render qualifications more interpretable by standardizing the meaning of various credentials and requiring that they be externally validated.

AlmaLaurea, a comprehensive job board, provides a more extreme example. The platform has complete control over who has a presence on the platform (i.e., all graduates from a consortium of Italian universities), the extent of data that is made visible (educational records), and who can access it (registered employers), leaving no room for strategic action on the part of individuals. Because of the first facet of control, employers need not worry that adverse selection has created a pool of applicants that are prone to be less attractive than they seem to be. This enhances interpretability. Interpretability is also enhanced because recruiters can trust that all information reported there (e.g., classes took, grades earned) is accurately represented.

Recruitment portals and talent acquisition suites provide a third example. They empower employers to directly solicit data that individuals would not otherwise volunteer. This shifts some control over data extent to them as curator and reduces the scope of information asymmetry, which is the enabling condition for most kinds of strategic action. In addition, certain types of employer-solicited data, such as gathered through pre-employment testing, could

deter—or make more easily detectable—some types of strategic misrepresentation, such as to exaggerate those skills most likely to be verified by pre-employment tests.

As a fourth example, firms increasingly require disclosure of an applicant’s LinkedIn profile, and sometimes use these profiles in place of resumes (Feloni, 2017). As a result of this and a general evolution of norms, jobseekers feel pressure to have a presence on LinkedIn, and since so many do, this largely negates the possibility of adverse selection on this platform. Furthermore, employers can use these public profiles as a consistency check on candidate-supplied data (Ollington et al., 2013), because while jobseekers often adjust their resume to each employer of interest, they have only one LinkedIn page for all employers to see (Van Dijck, 2013), and this prevents them from adding employer-specific enticements.

To sum up the above, individuals naturally want to retain control over how their qualifications story is told. That is, they may want to preserve some kinds of information asymmetry so they can engage in strategic actions to inflate positives and hide negatives in order to preserve and enhance their noticeability during the discovery process. However, when platform operators have control, the scope of information symmetry and the individual’s discretion for strategic self-presentation is diminished, and this increases interpretability. Stated formally:

***Proposition 2c.** Increased discretion for strategic self-presentation on an LMT increases visibility through the noticeability pathway, but decreases visibility through interpretability pathway.*

### **3.4 Consequences of QV for Labor Search Efficiency**

The prior sections theorized how LMTs generally increase QV, and explored three paradoxical tensions in which some aspects of LMTs—i.e., crowding, application frictions, discretion for strategic self-presentation—promote visibility through one pathway even while they diminish visibility through another. In this section, I theorize the effects of QV on *labor search (LS) efficiency*, which I define as *the inverse of the level of resources needed to find, assess, and acquire a qualified and interested worker for a particular job or task*. LS efficiency is important not just because it lowers the cost of search, but because “reductions in search costs for employees and employers should yield aggregate gains in productivity and wages as the quality of job matches improves.” (Autor, 2001, p. 33).

A large stream of research in economics has examined technology’s role in increasing search efficiency in general (Chade et al., 2017; Goldfarb & Tucker, 2019), and in lowering labor search costs in particular (Autor, 2001; Rogerson et al., 2005). Much of the empirical research has linked search costs to unemployment and vacancies (Goldfarb & Tucker, 2019). For example, Kuhn and Mansour (2014) found a 25% reduction in reemployment time among those who used online tools. Likewise, HR scholars have postulated that emerging digital selection procedures can increase search efficiency (Tippins, 2015; Woods et al., 2020).

My argument for how QV promotes LS efficiency proceeds in three parts, one pertaining to discoverability of qualifications, and the others to accessibility and interpretability.

**Discoverability of Qualifications.** As indicated earlier, a worker’s qualifications are more discoverable when salient actors—people or algorithms—can more easily find the worker when looking for people with those qualifications. Suppose a recruiter is using a particular LMT, and that some number of individuals who are reachable through this LMT possess the qualifications the recruiter is seeking. If the recruiter can more easily find such workers—i.e., their qualifications are more discoverable—then that is another way of saying that the recruiter will require fewer resources to find them.

**Accessibility of Qualifications.** Labor search involves multiple rounds of screening and selection in which candidates are evaluated on progressively more detailed criteria, as depicted in the hiring funnel. Recall that qualifications are accessible when actors can easily locate, retrieve, and process details about a particular worker’s qualifications. Accessibility refers to data that is already codified, and also to the ease with which employers can extract and codify additional data and make that data available to recruiters, such as through psychometric testing (Tippins, 2015) or machine learning methods (Hickman et al., 2022; Sajjadiani et al., 2019).

Increasing accessibility allows each round of screens to be based on a fuller picture of candidate qualifications, which should improve search efficiency by avoiding certain kinds of Type I and Type II errors. Type I errors—i.e., passing someone on to the next stage of the funnel who should have been ejected—results in a waste of resources to identify the mistake in subsequent rounds of screening, or even worse, to bear the costs of mistakenly hiring an unqualified worker. These errors can occur when an employer lacks access to data (such as skills test results) that would show that a candidate is weaker than they appear to be (e.g., because a candidate has exaggerated their skills). Type II errors, by contrast, involve ejecting someone from the hiring funnel who should not have been. This carries the potential opportunity cost of hiring a less qualified worker in their place or no worker at all. These errors can occur when an employer lacks access to data that would have shined a more favorable light on a candidate, such as that they possess some skills that were (for whatever reason) not voluntarily disclosed. In sum, those Type I and II errors that arise from a lack of accessibility result in the waste of search resources, which means they reduce LS efficiency.<sup>10</sup>

**Interpretability of Qualifications.** Indicators of qualifications are interpretable when these indicators allow actors to make valid inferences about a person’s KSAOs. As with accessibility, increased interpretability improves search efficiency by helping to avoid Type I and Type II errors. Decreasing misinterpretations that overrate a candidate helps to avoid Type I errors, while decreasing misinterpretations that underrate candidates avoids Type II errors.

**Potential Boundary Conditions.** Although the above logic is fairly straightforward, some potential boundary conditions could apply. For example, if all employers embrace and use LMTs equally effectively, then some of efficiency benefits to each will be competed away, as the resulting increased discoverability for all firms will magnify competition for the most qualified candidates and reduce average yields for those candidates.<sup>11</sup> As another example, should it turn out that the most visible job candidates on certain LMTs tended to be adversely selected—as was speculated by some observers in the early days of job boards (Autor, 2001)—then this would attenuate the efficiency benefits of the increased QV produced by those LMTs, as recruiters would have to bring more careful scrutiny to bear on those candidates, and might still experience elevated Type I errors. As a third example, increased discoverability can increase the size of applicant pools to the point where recruiters must increasingly rely on algorithms to process the pool. Increased reliance on such algorithms could have unexpected consequences—such as systematic biases (Chan & Wang, 2018; Dastin, 2018)—that could attenuate the efficiency benefits of QV.

To summarize the above, although some boundary conditions may apply, the general effect of increasing the three dimensions of QV should be to make it easier to find out which workers should be granted entry to the hiring funnel, and should reduce the prevalence of Type I and

---

<sup>10</sup> For internal hiring, Type II errors can have additional negative consequences for rejected internal applicants. More specifically, when such applicants feel they were wrongly dismissed from consideration (or dismissed too soon), this can lead to lower motivation and satisfaction, and increased turnover risk (Dlugos & Keller, 2021).

<sup>11</sup> That said, since firms vary in how they define match quality, especially with respect to person-organization fit, each might be able to maintain their yield of candidates with the highest firm-specific fit.

Type II errors as workers are moved through the funnel, with a resulting increase in LS efficiency. More formally:

***Proposition 3:** Increased visibility of qualifications for a set of potentially recruitable workers enables organizations to increase the efficiency of their labor search spanning this set of workers.*

### **3.5 Plausible Indirect Consequences of QV Operating through Labor Search Efficiency**

LS efficiency is desirable not just for its own sake but also for its downstream consequences. In this section I explore several such consequences. Specifically, I offer some initial arguments for why QV-enabled increases in LS efficiency will, other things: (1) increase match quality for hired workers, (2) enable more diverse hires, (3) expand the feasible scope for internal mobility programs, and (4) expand the feasible scope for the gignification of work.

**Match Quality for Hired Workers.** Goldfarb and Tucker assert that “low search costs are likely to increase the quality of matches between buyers and sellers, firms and workers, etc.” (2019, p. 11), which implies that increased LS efficiency should likewise improve match quality. Increased LS efficiency arises from more efficient execution of the various stages of the hiring funnel. Greater efficiency in the early stages means that organizations can cast a wider net and let more leads into the funnel. An initiative at Unilever to restructure their hiring funnel provides an illustration (Felsoni, 2017).<sup>12</sup>

While efficiency in the early stages of the funnel enables firms to broaden their search heuristics and thereby create a larger pool of qualified applicants, efficiency in the later stages means firms can more carefully assess match quality for the best candidates from this larger applicant pool, which, other things equal, should enhance match quality for hired workers.

**Diversity of Hires.** Digital screens early in the recruiting process can enable managers to process a larger and more diverse set of applicants, because the screening cost per applicant is negligible. For example, digital screens allowed Unilever to discard pool-narrowing heuristics, such as only recruiting from certain schools, and using hard GPA cutoffs to determine who from these schools to interview (Felsoni, 2017). The enlarged pools of qualified candidates will usually contain a larger number of qualified diversity candidates, and other things equal, should enable more diverse hiring for employers that seek diversity. In fact, Unilever claimed to have hired “their most diverse class to date” with a “significant” increase in hiring of non-white applicants (Felsoni, 2017). Granted, if all firms seek to expand the diversity of their candidate pools at once, then some of the benefits to each will be diminished as competition expands for specific diversity candidates. However, because companies may differ in what they seek in a diversity candidate, this is not necessarily a zero-sum game.

**Internal Mobility.** A third plausible consequence of increased LS efficiency is to expand the feasible scope for internal mobility programs. One advantage of internal mobility is to give greater authority to people who are already socialized into the organization and possess firm-specific knowledge (Dessler, 2011, p. 212; Heneman et al., 2019, p. 270). It also empowers people who currently inhabit low-fit positions to move into higher-fit positions through

---

<sup>12</sup> Rather than following their traditional practice of targeting elite universities and arranging telephone interviews only for those with strongest qualifications (on paper), Unilever introduced two AI-enabled digital screens as the first steps in the process. Only those candidates passing these screens were granted in-person interviews. Unilever claims their new process doubled the number of applicants, tripled the number of schools they recruited from, reduced the average hiring cycle time by 75%, increased the final-round offer rate by about 25% (which suggests better identification of candidates with high person-job fit), and increased the acceptance rate in this larger group of offers by about 25% (which suggests an improved yield of high-fit candidates).

promotion or transfers (Weller et al., 2019). As a third potential advantage, Bidwell (2011) found that internal hires were cheaper, more productive, and less likely to leave than external workers hired into similar positions.

One of the most common ways to promote internal mobility is to prefer internal hiring for non-entry level positions (Cappelli, 2019). However, such preferences have a subtle cost arising from *vacancy chains*. Filling an open position with an internal candidate usually has the side effect of creating a new vacancy to replace the internally-hired worker, and if that vacancy is filled from within, and the next, then the result is a chain of vacancies (Bidwell, 2017, 2020; Haveman & Cohen, 1994). This chain only ends with an external entry-level hire, or by encountering a unit that has enough slack to get by without replacing the lost worker. However, firm-specific LMTs—and in particular, internal talent management suites (Heneman et al., 2019, p. 518)—increase the visibility of internal job candidates, and thereby reduce search costs for each link in the chain.

Because of vacancy chains, expanding internal mobility will mean engaging in labor search more frequently. To the extent the costs associated with increased search frequency constitute an impediment to expanding internal mobility, an increase in search efficiency should expand the feasible scope for these programs.

**Giggification of Work.** A fourth plausible consequence of increased LS efficiency is to expand the feasible scope for the *giggification* of work, i.e., the organization of work as a collection of gigs to be completed by individuals who are dynamically sourced from a pool of available gig workers. A key advantage of *giggification* is to enhance a firm's ability to grow or shrink their workforce in response to shifts in demand for labor overall and for particular skills (Ashford et al., 2007; Pfeffer & Baron, 1988).<sup>13</sup> Gig workers can be sourced externally using an online labor market, or internally using an internal talent marketplace.<sup>14</sup>

Regardless of how firms source gig workers, increased *giggification* will—as with increased mobility—increase the frequency of labor search, perhaps dramatically so, because some portion of tasks a manager would otherwise directly assign to role-based workers will instead require a search for a suitable external or internal gig worker. The use of LMTs will generally improve the efficiency of these searches by increasing the QV for potential workers. Lowering search costs for external gig workers can also be viewed as reducing the transaction costs associated with getting labor from the market, which, per transaction cost economics (Tadelis & Williamson, 2012), should expand the feasible scope for externally sourced gig workers.

To the extent that the search costs resulting from increased search frequency constitute an impediment to *giggification*, an increase in search efficiency—as enabled increased QV—should expand the feasible scope for *giggification* of work.

#### 4. Discussion and Future Work

The visibility of qualifications is of central importance to labor search in general and the person-job matching process in particular. However, there has been little in the way of focused attention on QV as a concept, its antecedents, and its consequence—despite the emergence of a wide

---

<sup>13</sup> Firms can also avoid various expenses associated with full time employees, including employee benefits, maintaining norms of pay equity, providing ongoing training and development, and continuing to pay workers during temporary downturns in demand (Ashford et al., 2007; Barley et al., 2017; Pfeffer & Baron, 1988).

<sup>14</sup> Organizations have two ways to create a pool of internal gig workers. First, they can designate certain employees to be pure gig workers who move fluidly among units to complete discrete projects, lacking a persistent attachment to any particular organizational unit (e.g., (Boudreau, 2010)). Alternatively, organizations can allow ordinary employees to accept side-gigs, i.e., special projects that they complete in addition to their normal duties (Kiron et al., 2020).

variety of LMTs that magnify QV and shape it in non-obvious ways. Accordingly, the central contributions of this paper are: (1) to develop the concept of qualifications visibility and elaborate its dimensionality, (2) to delineate how it is magnified and shaped by LMTs, and (3) draw on theories of visibility, signaling, and strategic self-presentation to devise a theoretical model of labor search that places QV at its center. These contributions have potential implications for a number of broad literatures (e.g., visibility, LMTs, labor search, signaling, strategic self-presentation). However, here I will focus on two literatures in particular: (1) visibility in organizations and society, (2) labor search in the context of organizational staffing, particularly as it relates to hiring and staff deployment.

**Visibility in Organizations and Society.** As already noted, visibility has received growing attention as a theoretical concept. Some scholars take a broad perspective on visibility in (e.g., (Brantner & Stehle, 2021; Brighenti, 2007, 2010; Leonardi & Treem, 2020)) while others focus more narrowly on visibilities related to social media, knowledge management, or other communication technologies (Leonardi, 2014; Leonardi & Treem, 2012; Safari et al., 2022; Treem & Leonardi, 2013; Treem et al., 2020; Yoon et al., 2024). A closely related stream considers the implications of pervasive personal data digitalization (PDD), such as for human autonomy and dignity (Davidson et al., 2023; Leidner & Tona, 2021; Zuboff, 2023). Of course, digitized personal data must first be made *visible* to people and algorithms (such as through the LMTs described in this paper) in order to have implications for autonomy and dignity analyzed in this literature. Even so, the visibility of worker *qualifications* has not been a focus in the visibility<sup>15</sup> or PDD literatures. QV as developed here and the explication of how it is shaped by LMTs could provide a foundation for visibility scholars—and those concerned with the effects of PDD on human autonomy and dignity—to extend their inquiries to the staffing domain. Of particular interest here are variations across platforms regarding the locus of control, and my delineation of the three QV control dimensions: platform presence, qualifications data extent, and qualifications access.

Also of relevance to visibility scholars could be the general idea of formally unpacking visibility dimensions, and perhaps the specific dimensions unpacked in this paper. Although I've used this decomposition to surface tensions pertaining to labor search, this same decomposition—with suitable adaptations—might be useful in other domains of interest to visibility researchers. For example, scholars of communication visibility might examine how organizations employ the features offered by team collaboration tools like Slack to manage visibility tensions with respect to team communications and work products. This is particularly relevant to organizations that use such tools to enact a more open policy regarding team communications, perhaps even to the point of “radical transparency” (Dalio, 2018; Rouif, 2024). Could a policy of team communication openness on the detectability and noticeability dimensions trigger unintended effects related to accessibility and interpretability? Might employees react—as they have in other contexts (Anteby & Chan, 2018; Bernstein, 2012)—to what they perceive as excessive visibility by taking active measures to hide their activities? For example, could some team members seek to thwart the increased detectability and noticeably produced by open communication policies by diverting communications to private or unofficial channels, thus making them less accessible (even to fellow team members) than they would have been without the policy? In what contexts would this be most likely to happen? And do team members have to interpret communications differently in organizations where they have to wonder if some people are mostly playing to a crowd beyond the team? To sum up, the dimensions of QV delineated here, with suitable adaptations, could provide a framework to inspire new theorizing and empirical work related to

---

<sup>15</sup> A notable exception is Leonardi and Treem (2012), who examined how individuals used a knowledge management platform to shape perceptions of their knowledge and skills in order to affect the interpretations of others as to their qualifications to perform certain kinds of tasks.

the transparency paradox (Leonardi & Treem, 2020, p. 1213) in which “efforts by organizations to provide greater transparency into communication, information, and operations can actually obscure and obfuscate organizational activities, rendering them functionally invisible.”

**Labor Search in the Context of Organizational Staffing.** Although QV has potential implications beyond human resources (as just noted), the theory’s most direct implications are in the HR domain, specifically for labor search. A natural starting point for scholars would be to investigate the model’s propositions.

For example, Proposition 2b turns on the fact that application frictions can create credible signals of quality and intent that increase visibility through the interpretability pathway. In the HR literature that uses signaling theory as a lens (Connelly et al., 2011), research has taken the employer-as-signaler perspective almost exclusively (Celani & Singh, 2011), and has mostly attended to actions that employers can take to make themselves more visible in ways that send credible signals, rather than how to interpret signals from applicants. As a result, Celani and Singh have called for a rebalancing of scholarly attention, as previously noted. The rise of LMTs creates a corresponding rise in the ability of employers to judge and manage the signals they receive from applicants. Future research could use signaling as a theoretical basis, and prior work on the college application process (Avery & Levin, 2010; Knight & Schiff, 2022; Smith et al., 2015) as an empirical model for how to study job application frictions, and the circumstances in which they can create credible signals of job-seeker quality and intent. While public data on the use of mechanisms that increase (or reduce) applications frictions in hiring are less accessible than for college admissions, it should be possible to get some insights from scraping recruitment portals, or enlisting the active cooperation of specific firms. In addition, existing HR studies on realistic job previews (RJPs) (Bretz Jr & Judge, 1998; Phillips, 1998; Ryan et al., 2000), including one that has taken a signaling frame (Capitano et al., 2022), could be a source of research design ideas for studying Proposition 2b. Finally, it might be interesting to extend theorizing to distinguish between two different kinds of application frictions: those that make it more difficult for candidates to decide if a firm is application-worthy, and those that make it more difficult to actually apply once the application decision has been made. Perhaps only the latter sort of friction has the paradoxical effects posited in P2b.

As a second example, researchers could use Proposition 2a (LMT-related crowding and QV), and Proposition 2c (LMT-enabled strategic-self presentation and QV), to support a new stream of research on the evolution and efficacy of jobseeker tactics in an era of increasing QV—and the potential employer responses to these tactics. Such research could use strategic self-presentation as a theoretical lens. For example, field researchers could engage with jobseekers to discover what kinds of tactics they employ to remain noticeable on increasingly crowded visibility fields, and the implications of those tactics for the interpretability dimension of QV.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, as visibility fields become more crowded, the aphorism “it’s not what you know, it’s who you know” might warrant new attention. Does this aphorism—which highlights the role of networking and referrals in employment (Granovetter, 2018; Mouw, 2003; Obukhova & Lan, 2013)—become less salient in an era of increased QV, where it has become far easier for

---

<sup>16</sup> Rahman’s (2021) ethnographic study of online labor markets provides an example of this style of research for qualitative researchers. Quantitative researchers could also study jobseeker tactics, but they will probably will need to devise ways to quantify strategic self-presentation. Towards this end, Twyman et al. (2020) have developed a system that uses non-intrusive methods that are already part of the digital application process in many firms (i.e., asynchronous video interviews) to extract evidence of lying about qualifications. Sajjadiani et al. (2019) use AI algorithms to automatically map a candidate’s work history or other data to more interpretable KSAO categories, ones that predict actual job outcomes. This technique might provide a baseline from which to identify some kinds of strategic misrepresentation. Also of potential relevance are tools to detect cheating in online assessments (see Tippins (2015) and Woods et al. (2020) for good discussions of the incidence of cheating and the current state of countermeasures.)



strangers to discover, access, and interpret representations of *what you know*? Or does it become more salient because jobseekers can now use professional SNS (Garg & Telang, 2018) to leverage *who they know* on a far grander scale? It seems quite plausible that personal contacts could increase in importance as a mechanism to compensate for the loss of noticeability that results from increased crowding, per Proposition 2a. Alternatively, it might be conjectured that personal networking has a curvilinear relationship in which it matters most at low levels of crowding (where it provides a much-needed alternative pathway for detectability) and at high levels (where it provides a much-needed alternative pathway for noticeability).

As a third example, researchers could empirically examine the consequences of QV for LS efficiency (Proposition 3). LS efficiency is of interest due to its intrinsic importance (most organizations do after all seek to improve their efficiency) but also because of the potential downstream consequences identified in Section 3.5, i.e., for match quality, diversity, internal mobility, and giggification. Because the general link between QV and LS efficiency is comparatively straightforward—other things equal increased QV should improve LS efficiency—researchers might devote their most keen attention to indirect consequences of QV working through LS efficiency, and to exploring boundary conditions. Regarding boundary conditions, future research could, for example, examine whether the efficiency benefits experienced by early adopters and certain beneficial downstream consequences (particularly improved match quality and increased diversity of hires) have attenuated over time as an increasing number of employers embrace LMTs. In addition, researchers could compare LMTs that vary in their susceptibility to adverse selection or strategic self-presentation to see how these variations affect their efficacy in promoting QV and downstream consequences. In general, the least susceptible are comprehensive job boards, people aggregator sites, and online labor market platforms, which exert maximum control over the three dimensions of platform presence, qualifications data extent, and data access (see Table 5). The most susceptible are those that put individuals in control, including job boards and professional SNS. Credential networks that comply with the self-sovereign identity model are an interesting exception: Individuals retain complete control over whether to have a platform presence and what data to make accessible to whom—but because key credentials are externally validated, individuals have a curtailed ability to engage in many forms of strategic self-presentation.

## 5. Summary and Conclusions

Visibility has become a popular topic for theorizing in management and communication, but one kind of visibility largely absent from this stream is the visibility of qualifications. This absence is surprising given the importance of QV in staffing and labor search, and the major shift in the nature and extent of QV that has been triggered by the rise of LMTs.

In this paper I've developed the concept of QV—anchored on prior visibility concepts from the management and communication literature—and placed it in a nomological network standing between LMTs and labor search efficiency. I have specified how LMTs shape QV, and highlighted the role of some paradoxical tensions that complicate this shaping process. I have also provided initial rationales for some indirect consequences of QV acting through labor search efficiency. The goal of these efforts has been to clarify why QV is a useful and powerful concept worthy of focused attention, and to create a robust conceptual platform for future work on the implications of QV for labor search.

## Appendix A: Visibility Concepts in Prior Work

Source	Category	Definition	Facets
<b>This paper</b>	<b>Qualifications visibility</b> in labor search	Qualifications visibility is the ease with which salient actors can discover, access, and interpret a person's qualifications for particular jobs or tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Discoverability</li> <li>• Accessibility</li> <li>• Interpretability</li> </ul>
<b>Stohl et al. 2016<sup>17</sup></b>	<b>Information visibility</b> to facilitate organizational transparency	Information visibility is "the combination of three attributes: availability of information, approval to disseminate information, and accessibility of information to third parties" (p. 124)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability</li> <li>• Approval to disseminate</li> <li>• Accessibility to third parties</li> </ul>
<b>Treem et al. 2020</b>	<b>Communication visibility</b> pertaining to individual messages in organizations	"Communication visibility refers to the outcomes of activities through which actors strategically or inadvertently: (a) make their communication more or less available, salient, or noticeable to others, and (b) view, access, or become exposed to the communication of others, as they (c) interact with a particular sociomaterial context" (p. 46).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Actors affect the visibility of communication by making it more or less <i>available, salient or noticeable to others</i></li> </ul>
<b>Leonardi &amp; Treem 2020</b>	<b>Behavior visibility</b> in organizations and society	Behavioral visibility is the "sociomaterial performance of the behavior of people, collectives, technological devices, or nature in a format that can be observed by third parties through minimal effort such that patterns, causes, or motives can be inferred (regardless of the veracity of those inferences)" (p. 1605)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encompasses behavior of people, collectives, devices, and nature that can be observed with minimal effort</li> </ul>
<b>Brantner &amp; Stehle 2021</b>	<b>Digital visibility</b> of individuals in organizations and society	"'Digital visibility' refers to perceptibility as the likelihood of being 'seen' in the sense of being noticeable (this understanding is closest to the original understanding), in being heard or noticed, or in the sense of being respected or recognized" (p. 93)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Being noticeable</li> <li>• Being heard or noticed</li> <li>• Being respected or recognized</li> </ul>

<sup>17</sup> Of the visibility concepts highlighted here, my approach most closely corresponds to Stohl et al. (2016). Their *availability*, which arises from inscribing (i.e., writing down) information about an organization's decisions and actions, and then storing inscribed information in physical files or digital systems, can be seen as an enabling condition for my notion of *discoverability*. Their *approval*, which grants permission to see stored information, maps most closely to my notion of *accessibility*. Finally, their *accessibility*, which comprises enabling conditions that make it easier and more feasible for a person to retrieve and interpret information to which they have been granted access, overlaps with my *accessibility* and *interpretability* dimensions.

## REFERENCES

- Acikgoz, Y. (2019). Employee recruitment and job search: Towards a multi-level integration. *Human Resource Management Review*, 29(1), 1-13.
- Agrawal, A., Horton, J., Lacetera, N., & Lyons, E. (2015). Digitization and the contract labor market: A research agenda. In *Economic Analysis of the Digital Economy* (pp. 219-250). University of Chicago Press.
- Aguinis, H., & Lawal, S. O. (2013). eLancing: A review and research agenda for bridging the science–practice gap. *Human Resource Management Review*, 23(1), 6-17.
- Anteby, M., & Chan, C. K. (2018). A self-fulfilling cycle of coercive surveillance: Workers' invisibility practices and managerial justification. *Organization Science*, 29(2), 247-263.
- Ashford, S. J., George, E., & Blatt, R. (2007). Old assumptions, new work: The opportunities and challenges of research on nonstandard employment. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 1(1), 65-117.
- Autor, D. H. (2001). Wiring the labor market. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 15(1), 25-40.
- Autor, D. H. (2009). Studies of labor market intermediation: Introduction. In D. H. Autor (Ed.), *Studies of labor market intermediation* (pp. 1-26). University of Chicago Press.
- Avery, C., & Levin, J. (2010). Early admissions at selective colleges. *American Economic Review*, 100(5), 2125-2156.
- Bagues, M. F., & Labini, M. S. (2009). Do online labor market intermediaries matter? The impact of AlmaLaurea on the university-to-work transition. In D. H. Autor (Ed.), *Studies of labor market intermediation* (pp. 127-154).
- Barley, S. R., Bechky, B. A., & Milliken, F. J. (2017). The changing nature of work: Careers, identities, and work lives in the 21st century. *Academy of Management Discoveries*, 3(2), 111-115.
- Barrick, M. R., & Parks-Leduc, L. (2019). Selection for fit. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, 6, 171-193.
- Baum, M., & Kabst, R. (2014). The effectiveness of recruitment advertisements and recruitment websites: Indirect and interactive effects on applicant attraction. *Human Resource Management*, 53(3), 353-378.
- Benway, J. P. (1998). Banner blindness: The irony of attention grabbing on the World Wide Web. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting.
- Bernstein, E. S. (2012). The transparency paradox: A role for privacy in organizational learning and operational control. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 57(2), 181-216.
- Bersin, J. (2017). Transformative Tech: A disruptive year ahead. *HR Magazine*, 62(1).
- Bidwell, M. (2011). Paying more to get less: The effects of external hiring versus internal mobility. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 56(3), 369-407.
- Bidwell, M. (2017). Managing talent flows through internal and external labor markets. *The Oxford handbook of talent management*, 283-300.
- Bidwell, M. (2020). No vacancies? Building theory on how organizations move people across jobs. In *Employee inter-and intra-firm mobility*. Emerald Publishing Limited.
- Black, J. S., & van Esch, P. (2020). AI-enabled recruiting: What is it and how should a manager use it? *Business Horizons*, 63(2), 215-226.
- Bonet, R., Cappelli, P., & Hamori, M. (2013). Labor market intermediaries and the new paradigm for human resources. *Academy of Management Annals*, 7(1), 341-392.
- Boudreau, J. W. (2010). *IBM's global talent management strategy: The vision of the globally integrated enterprise*. Society for Human Resource Management Alexandria, VA.
- Brantner, C., & Stehle, H. (2021). Visibility in the digital age: Introduction. *Studies in Communication Sciences*, 21(1), 93–98.
- Breaugh, J. A. (2008). Employee recruitment: Current knowledge and important areas for future research. *Human Resource Management Review*, 18(3), 103-118.

- Brenner, S., Aksin Sivrikaya, S., & Schwalbach, J. (2020). Who is on LinkedIn? Self-selection into professional online networks. *Applied Economics*, 52(1), 52-67.
- Bretz Jr, R. D., & Judge, T. A. (1998). Realistic job previews: A test of the adverse self-selection hypothesis. *Journal of applied psychology*, 83(2), 330.
- Brighenti, A. (2007). Visibility: A category for the social sciences. *Current Sociology*, 55(3), 323-342.
- Brighenti, A. (2010). *Visibility in social theory and social research*. Springer.
- Bryan, L., Joyce, C., & Weiss, L. (2006). Making a market in talent [Article]. *McKinsey Quarterly*(2), 98-109.
- Cable, D. M., & Turban, D. B. (2003). The value of organizational reputation in the recruitment context: A brand-equity perspective. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 33(11), 2244-2266.
- Caldwell, D. F., & O'Reilly III, C. A. (1990). Measuring person-job fit with a profile-comparison process. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 75(6), 648.
- Campion, M. A., Fink, A. A., Ruggeberg, B. J., Carr, L., Phillips, G. M., & Odman, R. B. (2011). Doing competencies well: Best practices in competency modeling. *Personnel psychology*, 64(1), 225-262.
- Capitano, J., Thomas, B. J., & Meglich, P. (2022). If I knew then what I know now: How realistic previews of onboarding influence self-selection and expectations. *Group & Organization Management*, 10596011221115609.
- Cappelli, P. (2019). Your approach to hiring is all wrong. *Harvard Business Review*, 97(3), 48-58.
- Cappelli, P., & Keller, J. R. (2013). Classifying work in the new economy. *Academy of Management Review*, 38(4), 575-596.
- Cascio, W. F., & Boudreau, J. W. (2017). Talent Management of Nonstandard Employees. *Oxford Handbook of Talent Management*, 494-520.
- Celani, A., & Singh, P. (2011). Signaling theory and applicant attraction outcomes. *Personnel Review*, 40(2), 222-238.
- Chade, H., Eeckhout, J., & Smith, L. (2017). Sorting through search and matching models in economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 55(2), 493-544.
- Chan, J., & Wang, J. (2018). Hiring preferences in online labor markets: Evidence of a female hiring bias. *Management Science*, 64(7), 2973-2994.
- Chapman, D. S., Uggerslev, K. L., Carroll, S. A., Piasentin, K. A., & Jones, D. A. (2005). Applicant attraction to organizations and job choice: A meta-analytic review of the correlates of recruiting outcomes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 90(5), 928-944.
- Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling theory: A review and assessment. *Journal of Management*, 37(1), 39-67.
- Constantinides, P., Henfridsson, O., & Parker, G. G. (2018). Introduction—platforms and infrastructures in the digital age. *Information Systems Research*, 29(2), 381-400.
- Dalio, R. (2018). *Principles*. Simon and Schuster.
- Dastin, J. (2018). Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women. In *Ethics of Data and Analytics* (pp. 296-299). Auerbach Publications.
- Davidson, E., Wessel, L., Winter, J. S., & Winter, S. (2023). Future directions for scholarship on data governance, digital innovation, and grand challenges. *Information and Organization*, 33(1), 100454.
- Dellarocas, C. (2006). Reputation mechanisms. In T. Hendershott (Ed.), *Handbook on economics and information systems* (pp. 629-660). Emerald Publishing Group.
- Dessler, G. (2011). *Fundamentals of human resource management* (2nd ed.). Prentice-Hall.
- Dlugos, K., & Keller, J. (2021). Turned down and taking off? Rejection and turnover in internal talent markets. *Academy of Management Journal*, 64(1), 63-85.

- Drew, T., Vö, M. L.-H., & Wolfe, J. M. (2013). W. *Psychological Science*, 24(9), 1848-1853.
- Dunn, J. (2013). *Admissions receives 25,000 applications for class of 2017*. Retrieved January 15 from <https://www.bc.edu/bc-web/bcnews/news-archive-2011-to-2015/chronicle/2013/topstories/applications013013.html>
- Edwards, J. R. (1991). Person-job fit: A conceptual integration, literature review, and methodological critique. In *International review of industrial/organizational psychology* (Vol. 6, pp. 283-357). Wiley.
- Feloni, R. (2017). Consumer-goods giant Unilever has been hiring employees using brain games and artificial intelligence—and it's a huge success. *Business Insider*(28).
- Friess, S. (2017). Sprawling freelancer network pays dividends for The Washington Post. Retrieved December 26, 2019, from [https://www.cjr.org/business\\_of\\_news/washington\\_post\\_freelance\\_network.php](https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/washington_post_freelance_network.php)
- Fuller, J., Raman, M., Palano, J., & Vaduganathan, N. (2020). *Building the on-demand workforce*. Harvard Business School and BCG.
- Garg, R., & Telang, R. (2018). To be or not to be linked: Online social networks and job search by unemployed workforce. *Management Science*, 64(8), 3926-3941.
- Goffman, E. (1959). *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Anchor Books.
- Goffman, E. (1971). *Relations in public*. Transaction Publishers.
- Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019). Digital economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 57(1), 3-43.
- Granovetter, M. (2018). *Getting a job: A study of contacts and careers*. University of Chicago press.
- Haveman, H. A., & Cohen, L. E. (1994). The ecological dynamics of careers: The impact of organizational founding, dissolution, and merger on job mobility. *American Journal of Sociology*, 100(1), 104-152.
- Heneman, H. G., Judge, T., & Kammeyer-Mueller, J. (2019). *Staffing Organizations* (9th ed.). McGraw-Hill New York.
- Hickman, L., Bosch, N., Ng, V., Saef, R., Tay, L., & Woo, S. E. (2022). Automated video interview personality assessments: Reliability, validity, and generalizability investigations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 107(8), 1323.
- Hogan, B. (2010). The presentation of self in the age of social media: Distinguishing performances and exhibitions online. *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, 30(6), 377-386.
- Holm, A. B. (2012). E-recruitment: towards an ubiquitous recruitment process and candidate relationship management. *German Journal of Human Resource Management*, 26(3), 241-259.
- Holmes, D. E. (2019). Expanding the Pool [Article]. *Harvard Business Review*, 97(3), 58-61.
- Horton, J. J. (2017). The effects of algorithmic labor market recommendations: Evidence from a field experiment. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 35(2), 345-385.
- King, S., & Ockels, C. (2016). How PwC and The Washington Post are finding and hiring external talent. *Harvard Business Review*. Retrieved December 12, 2019, from <https://hbr.org/2016/03/how-pwc-and-the-washington-post-are-finding-and-hiring-external-talent>
- Kiron, D., Schwartz, J., Jones, R., & Buckley, N. (2020). Create a crisis growth plan: Start with opportunity marketplaces. *MIT Sloan Management Review*, 61(4), 1-5.
- Knight, B., & Schiff, N. (2022). Reducing frictions in college admissions: Evidence from the Common Application. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 14(1), 179-206.
- Kokkodis, M. (2021). Dynamic, multidimensional, and skillset-specific reputation systems for online work. *Information Systems Research*, 32(3), 688-712.

- Kristof-Brown, A. L., Zimmerman, R. D., & Johnson, E. C. (2005). Consequences of individuals' fit at work: A meta-analysis of person–job, person–organization, person–group, and person–supervisor fit. *Personnel Psychology*, 58(2), 281-342.
- Kuhn, P., & Mansour, H. (2014). Is Internet job search still ineffective? *The Economic Journal*, 124(581), 1213-1233.
- Labrecque, L. I., Markos, E., & Milne, G. R. (2011). Online personal branding: Processes, challenges, and implications. *Journal of Interactive Marketing*, 25(1), 37-50.
- Lacity, M., & Carmel, E. (2022). Self-sovereign identity and verifiable credentials in your digital wallet *MIS Quarterly Executive*, 21(3).
- Landers, R. N., & Schmidt, G. B. (2016). Social media in employee selection and recruitment: An overview. *Social media in employee selection and recruitment: Theory, practice, and current challenges*, 3-11.
- Lappas, T., Sabnis, G., & Valkanas, G. (2016). The impact of fake reviews on online visibility: A vulnerability assessment of the hotel industry. *Information Systems Research*, 27(4), 940-961.
- Leidner, D. E., & Tona, O. (2021). The CARE theory of dignity amid personal data digitalization. *MIS Quarterly*, 45(1).
- Leonardi, P. M. (2014). Social media, knowledge sharing, and innovation: Toward a theory of communication visibility [Article]. *Information Systems Research*, 25(4), 796-816.
- Leonardi, P. M., & Treem, J. W. (2012). Knowledge management technology as a stage for strategic self-presentation: Implications for knowledge sharing in organizations. *Information & Organization*, 22(1), 37-59.
- Leonardi, P. M., & Treem, J. W. (2020). Behavioral visibility: A new paradigm for organization studies in the age of digitization, digitalization, and datafication. *Organization Studies*, 41(12), 1601-1625.
- Levina, N., & Arriaga, M. (2014). Distinction and status production on user-generated content platforms: using bourdieu's theory of cultural production to understand social dynamics in online fields [Article]. *Information Systems Research*, 25(3), 468-488.
- Li, J., & Netessine, S. (2020). Higher market thickness reduces matching rate in online platforms: Evidence from a quasiexperiment. *Management Science*, 66(1), 271-289.
- Liu, M., Brynjolfsson, E., & Dowlatabadi, J. (2021). Do digital platforms reduce moral hazard? The case of Uber and taxis. *Management Science*, 67(8), 4665-4685.
- Lukacik, E.-R., Bourdage, J. S., & Roulin, N. (2022). Into the void: A conceptual model and research agenda for the design and use of asynchronous video interviews. *Human Resource Management Review*, 32(1), 100789.
- Malone, T. W. (2004). Bringing the market inside [Article]. *Harvard Business Review*, 82(4), 106-114.
- Mouw, T. (2003). Social capital and finding a job: do contacts matter? *American sociological review*, 68, 868-898.
- Nakamura, A. O., Shaw, K. L., Freeman, R. B., Nakamura, E., & Pyman, A. (2009). Jobs online. In *Studies of labor market intermediation* (pp. 27-65). University of Chicago Press.
- Nietzel, M. T. (2020). New Network Will Build An “Internet of Careers”: Using Blockchain To Control Your Own Career Credentials. *Forbes*. Retrieved June 24, 2021, from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelt Nietzel/2020/01/28/the-velocity-network-foundation-using-blockchain-to-control-your-own-career-credentials/>
- Obukhova, E., & Lan, G. (2013). Do job seekers benefit from contacts? A direct test with contemporaneous searches. *Management Science*, 59(10), 2204-2216.
- Ollington, N., Gibb, J., & Harcourt, M. (2013). Online social networks: an emergent recruiter tool for attracting and screening. *Personnel Review*, 42(3), 248-265.

- Pfeffer, J., & Baron, J. N. (1988). Taking the workers back out: Recent trends in the structuring of employment [Article]. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 10, 257.
- Phillips, J. (2023). *Strategic Staffing* (4th ed.). Chicago Business Press.
- Phillips, J. M. (1998). Effects of realistic job previews on multiple organizational outcomes: A meta-analysis. *Academy of Management Journal*, 41(6), 673-690.
- Ployhart, R. E. (2006). Staffing in the 21st century: New challenges and strategic opportunities. *Journal of management*, 32(6), 868-897.
- Purvis, J. (2016). Human resources marketing and recruiting: Essentials of digital recruiting. In M. Zeuch (Ed.), *Handbook of Human Resources Management*. Springer.
- PwC. (2023). *PwC US careers: Join our talent community*. Retrieved January 9 from <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/careers/talent-community.html>
- Rahman, H. A. (2021). The invisible cage: Workers' reactivity to opaque algorithmic evaluations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 66(4), 945-988.
- Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Friedman, E., & Kuwabara, K. (2000). Reputation systems [Article]. *Communications of the ACM*, 43(12), 45-48.
- Rhue, L. (2014). *Social and economic consequences of digital visibility*. New York University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
- Rogerson, R., Shimer, R., & Wright, R. (2005). Search-theoretic models of the labor market: A survey. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43(4), 959-988.
- Roth, P. L., Bobko, P., Van Iddekinge, C. H., & Thatcher, J. B. (2016). Social media in employee-selection-related decisions: A research agenda for uncharted territory. *Journal of Management*, 42(1), 269-298.
- Rouif, M. (2024). How our 'No DMs' Slack policy transformed workplace communication. *Fast Company*. Retrieved 10-05-2024, from <https://www.fastcompany.com/91174764/how-our-no-dms-slack-policy-transformed-workplace-communication>
- Roulin, N., & Levashina, J. (2019). LinkedIn as a new selection method: Psychometric properties and assessment approach. *Personnel Psychology*, 72(2), 187-211.
- Ryan, A. M., Sacco, J. M., McFarland, L. A., & Kriska, S. D. (2000). Applicant self-selection: Correlates of withdrawal from a multiple hurdle process. *Journal of applied psychology*, 85(2), 163.
- Safari, N., Andrade, A. D., & Techatassanasoontorn, A. A. (2022). Visibility of knowledge in social media: Conceptualization and instrument development. *Information & Management*, 59(6), 103676.
- Sajjadiani, S., Sojourner, A. J., Kammeyer-Mueller, J. D., & Mykerezi, E. (2019). Using machine learning to translate applicant work history into predictors of performance and turnover. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 104(10), 1207.
- Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998). The validity and utility of selection methods in personnel psychology: Practical and theoretical implications of 85 years of research findings. *Psychological bulletin*, 124(2), 262.
- Settles, I. H., Buchanan, N. T., & Dotson, K. (2019). Scrutinized but not recognized:(In) visibility and hypervisibility experiences of faculty of color. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 113, 62-74.
- Smith, J., Hurwitz, M., & Howell, J. (2015). Screening mechanisms and student responses in the college market. *Economics of Education Review*, 44, 17-28.
- Spence, M. (1978). Job market signaling. In *Uncertainty in Economics* (pp. 281-306). Elsevier.
- Spence, M. (2002). Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets. *American Economic Review*, 92(3), 434-459.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). The contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century economics. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(4), 1441-1478.

- Stohl, C., Stohl, M., & Leonardi, P. M. (2016). Managing opacity: Information visibility and the paradox of transparency in the digital age. *International Journal of Communication, 10*, 15.
- Tadelis, S. (2016). Reputation and feedback systems in online platform markets. *Annual Review of Economics, 8*, 321-340.
- Tadelis, S., & Williamson, O. E. (2012). Transaction cost economics. *Handbook of Organizational Economics*, 159-193.
- Taj, S. A. (2016). Application of signaling theory in management research: Addressing major gaps in theory. *European Management Journal, 34*(4), 338-348.
- Terry, R. P., McGee, J. E., Kass, M. J., & Collings, D. G. (2023). Assessing star value: The influence of prior performance and visibility on compensation strategy. *Human Resource Management Journal, 33*(2), 307-327.
- Theurer, C. P., Tumasjan, A., Welpe, I. M., & Lievens, F. (2018). Employer branding: A brand equity-based literature review and research agenda. *International Journal of Management Reviews, 20*(1), 155-179.
- Tippins, N. T. (2015). Technology and assessment in selection. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 2*(1), 551-582.
- Treem, J. W., & Leonardi, P. M. (2013). Social media use in organizations: Exploring the affordances of visibility, editability, persistence, and association. *Annals of the International Communication Association, 36*(1), 143-189.
- Treem, J. W., Leonardi, P. M., & Van den Hooff, B. (2020). Computer-mediated communication in the age of communication visibility. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 25*(1), 44-59.
- Trusty, J., Allen, D. G., & Fabian, F. (2019). Hunting while working: An expanded model of employed job search. *Human Resource Management Review, 29*(1), 28-42.
- Twyman, N. W., Pentland, S. J., & Spitzley, L. (2020). Design principles for signal detection in modern job application systems: Identifying fabricated qualifications. *Journal of Management Information Systems, 37*(3), 849-874.
- Van Dijck, J. (2013). 'You have one identity': Performing the self on Facebook and LinkedIn. *Media, culture & society, 35*(2), 199-215.
- Watson, R. T., Plangger, K., Pitt, L., & Tiwana, A. (2023). A theory of information compression: When judgments are costly. *Information Systems Research, 34*(3), 1089-1108.
- Weller, I., Hymer, C. B., Nyberg, A. J., & Ebert, J. (2019). How matching creates value: Cogs and wheels for human capital resources research. *Academy of Management Annals, 13*(1), 188-214.
- Woods, S. A., Ahmed, S., Nikolaou, I., Costa, A. C., & Anderson, N. R. (2020). Personnel selection in the digital age: A review of validity and applicant reactions, and future research challenges. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 29*(1), 64-77.
- Yoon, K., Piercy, C. W., Kim, Y. J., & Zhu, Y. (2024). Boundary work and transactive memory systems in teams: moderating effects of the visibility affordance. *Management Communication Quarterly, 38*(2), 359-385.
- Zuboff, S. (2023). The age of surveillance capitalism. In *Social theory re-wired* (pp. 203-213). Routledge.