Media Values and Democratization: What Unites and What Divides Religious-Conservative and Pro-Secular Elites?

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ABSTRACT *This article presents a systematic content analysis of three religious-conservative and two pro-secular newspapers in 1996–2004 in Turkey, and discusses some findings and their implications regarding elite values and democratization: considerable internal pluralism within both religious-conservative and pro-secular elites; general consensus on democracy but not on democratic norms' application to specific issues and groups other than one's own; a division of values on religion, secularism, and social pluralism; Political value change in favor of liberal democracy but social conservatism among religious-conservative elites; fragmentation and relative cynicism, but not necessarily authoritarianism, among pro-secular elites; weak ideational change on the Kurdish issue. The article argues that the press plays a significant political role as a site where elite values change or are reproduced through discussion, deliberation, or silence. Values affect and are affected by political developments.*

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Introduction

In 1914, Turkish journalist Ahmed Emin (Yalman) defended his dissertation titled "The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press" at Columbia University. In the preface, he states that the press should be taken as a measure of development "because it has always been the leading factor in the Modern Turkish Movement."

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A century later observers seem to agree that the press continues to play a leading and active role in Turkish politics. This time, the press is also widely criticized for, among other deficits, ideological-political divisions, corruption, and weakness of democratic values.[1] However, these criticisms are rarely based in theoretically informed and systematic empirical evidence. Often, criticisms seem to be frozen in time. Today as much as two decades ago, Turkish journalist-intellectuals write that basic, electoral democracy has taken root in Turkey but needs to be developed and protected because political elites (including the media elites) lack a consensus on pluralistic democracy.[2] But, as the findings below illustrate, the Turkish press

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produces an impressive amount of open and critical discussion on a wide variety of subjects related to democratization.

One would expect all these self-critical and reflective discussions to produce some movement toward an elite consensus at least on some issues regarding pluralistic democracy over the years. Did this occur? Can it be that there is some consensus on pluralistic democracy but the emergence of more cooperation to promote it is prevented by value clashes on specific issues (in recent years allegedly a religious-secular cleavage)? If neither is true, how could one claim that the press matters, i.e. plays a leading (or autonomous) role?

In order to address such questions, this article presents and discusses some of the findings of a systematic and comparative content analysis of three religious-conservative and two pro-secular newspapers in Turkey. A critical period for Turkey's democratization, the years between 1996 and 2004 are covered. In interpreting the findings, the article also draws on historical event analysis and unstructured, complementary interviews with journalists. Specifically, two interrelated questions are investigated:

(i) which issues divide the Turkish media elites, on which issues is there more convergence of rhetoric, beliefs and values, and how much pluralism does exist within each newspaper?

(ii) To what extent and how did elite thinking change on critical issues and what kind of a relationship does seem to exist between any such changes and democratic development?

These questions have been a vivid part of Turkey's experience with democratization in recent years. Fierce media battles occurred between the government's supporters and skeptics in the media on the one hand, and between the government and the skeptical media on the other hand. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) was established by splitting from an earlier political Islamist party. During the 2000s, it transformed itself into a mass party with, using the party's own definition, a "conservative democratic" ideology. During the media battles, the pro-government elites portrayed themselves as the defenders of democratization against the beneficiaries of the military-bureaucratic guardian state. The latter, they charged, protected the "semi-democratic" status quo by using secularism as a pretext with the help of the "secularist" (*laikçi*) media elite. In turn, the skeptics— together with opposition parties such as the pro-secular Republican People's Party (CHP)—portrayed themselves as the defenders of secularism, secular democracy, or Atatürk's legacy of secular modernization. The AKP's policies and reforms, they charged, were not really aimed at democratization but at solidifying the party's majority rule and the country's gradual Islamization, with the help of the pro-government (*yandaş*) media.

While each side put most of the blame on the other, both sides seemed to agree that the media lacked consensus on democratic values and a categorical commitment to pluralistic democracy for all. Extant research on Turkish media tends to

agree that the media plays a mainly negative, subversive role in democratization, but rarely through systematic empirical examination.[3]

There is a need for more empirical and theoretical research on media and politics in Turkey as well as in the rest of the world. Content analyses form an indispensable part. However, for research to produce valid, reliable and comparable results, studies should employ a carefully selected combination of verifiable empirical evidence, transparent method, and interpretive examination in light of historical events and societal perceptions. Thus, the next two sections are devoted to a theoretical discussion of the media and politics followed by an explanation of the original method employed in the article. The subsequent sections illustrate and interpret the findings of the content analysis in three parts, each representing a different way in which media values seem to be linked with democratization and with political developments and institutions.

Media and Politics

There is widespread agreement among social scientists that the media's autonomous or exogenous role in politics have grown in recent decades. It is argued that media has not only been reflecting the characteristics of the political environment but also has been shaping it. From a normative-theoretical point of view, studies discuss under which conditions the media can play a positive democratic role by acting as a platform of communication, deliberation and information-provision, and thereby fostering a more effective citizenry and a more "considered" public opinion.[4] While not engaging these questions directly, the findings in this article show that the media discussions and value changes were linked with the subsequent political developments, the course of democratization in particular. This suggests that the media content can affect politics. Thus, this potential can be used to promote democracy, the more so if institutional reforms improve the quality of the media discussions/deliberations.

From a positive, empirical point of view, the challenge is to compare and contrast the media in different countries with respect to their relationship to politics. The findings from the content analysis help placing the Turkish press within the spectrum of "liberal, democratic-corporatist, and polarized-pluralist (Mediterranean)" models.[5] On the basis of historical-institutional parallels and cursory observations, one can expect the Turkish media to fit the polarized-pluralist model. This model is characterized by "political parallelism" and "external pluralism:" Different media organizations are divided along distinct political orientations, have close connections to political parties and other political organizations, and journalists are active in political life and try to influence, not merely inform, public opinion.[6] This expectation should be tested through empirical analysis. The Turkish press may be as polarized as expected on some issues but not on other issues. There may be more agreement on some democratic values. The press may also exhibit more internal pluralism, i.e. pluralism of opinion within each newspaper, than expected.

Many charges regarding illegitimate media interference with politics are difficult to test empirically because media power can be used in subtle ways and motivations behind them are hard to infer. For example, it is almost impossible for scholars to infer what motivates a newspaper to publish reports implicating a government in corruption cases. Is it the media's role as watchdog of politics or the specific (economic or ideological) interests of the newspaper publishing these reports? Sometimes, it is both. Corrupt linkages between politicians and the media owners exist, and often result in the latter's exercise of power over editors, journalists, and the content of reporting in exchange for economic and political privileges.[7] Some of such biased reporting regarding specific events and daily politics may possibly be tested through content analysis coupled with historical event analysis. Interviews with journalists provide important insights. But such interference of the press with daily politics, and vice versa, is outside the scope of this article.

## *Media and Political Development*

The object of analysis here is more specific: the discussions that take place in the media on long-term questions and subjects (such as democratization, secularism, ethnic-religious diversity, and the image of the West) and how the changes that may occur in the elite thinking (i.e. rhetoric, beliefs, and values) as a result of these discussions affect political development over time. Insofar as *changes* in the predominant beliefs and values in the media can plausibly be linked to subsequent political developments, examining the press as a measure of political development is justified, just like Yalman recommends.

There are three potential ways or causal mechanisms through which media can affect values and political development:

(i)   by shaping the public values and preferences;
(ii) by reflecting elite thinking; and
(iii) by serving as a site for the formation (change or maintenance) of elite thinking.

The focus in this article is on the latter two links. Various reasons can be cited to explain why the media's primary role during democratization may be as a site of elite discussion, contention, and preference formation.

There are many *a priori* reasons to expect that the press influences public opinion through its powers of agenda-setting, priming, framing, and persuasion.[8] Because people have limited time and cognitive resources to seek and process information themselves, they have good reasons to rely on the information, opinions, and frames offered to them by the media. In reality, however, such media powers are limited. This is mainly because relatively well-informed citizens are hard to persuade as they are already committed to a viewpoint, and relatively poorly-informed citizens are hard to persuade as they may not follow media content that contradicts their loyalties. Citizens in democracies also have significant audience autonomy to choose which newspaper to buy or which TV channel to watch. This further compels the

media to tailor their coverage to the preferences of their audience.[9] Whenever the public is divided on complex issues, journalists with expert knowledge may have more ability to influence, but not dominate, the public opinion on these issues of controversy.[10] Yet, it is hard to claim that experts, who are more ideologically committed than general public, are necessarily wiser than the masses.[11] Thus, many people may intuitively distrust experts' judgment and rely on their own, even with regard to complicated issues that require specific knowledge to comprehend.

In Turkey, the media's potential effects on the public opinion may be diminished by levels of literacy and education that lag behind per capita income, and the public's relatively low trust in the media.[12] The lack of mass newspapers in the formative periods of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries might have given rise to a journalistic culture less interested in informing the public and more interested in interpreting and shaping politics.[13] Turkish journalists are comparable to the French and can be contrasted with the American, who, relatively speaking, tend to view their primary role as reporting facts and contending views.[14] The share of commentary in the press reflects this pattern in the three countries. On a randomly selected day in 2008, op-ed pieces took 5.5 percent of the *New York Times* (excluding letters to the editor), while it took 8.3 percent of *Le Monde*, and 7.5 and 8.8 percent of the Turkish *Milliyet* and *Zaman* respectively.

Turkish journalists tend to view themselves as public intellectuals closely tied to the political field, and are often in pursuit of self-anointed goals such as democratization, justice or modernization. For example, the editor of a major newspaper I interviewed explained that he saw his paper's mission as advancing Turkish democracy [in accordance with his own beliefs]. He thought that, in line with this goal, his newspaper fulfilled a historical mission by shaping how the Western media portrayed actors in Turkish politics during crucial events.[15] Leading figures in the conservative/Islamist media were prominent in the discussions leading to "Islamist new thinking" and the AKP's emergence as a new kind of Islamic-conservative political force.[16] Many journalists join political parties close to their ideological orientations and run for public office during the course of their careers. The Islamic-conservative press also acts as a vehicle for recruiting politicians from the liberal-secular side: some secular-liberal politicians began to write in religious newspapers before joining later the AKP.

To various degrees in different newspapers, journalists in the same paper tend to share the same worldview through self-selection or professional socialization. Reportedly, in one journalist's words, "there is no conflict [in the paper]. We already speak the same language."[17] Notwithstanding this perception of some journalists, other journalists, as also observed in the findings from the content analysis in this article, point to the presence of significant internal pluralism within each newspaper. Many columnists criticize governments even though their newspapers may be perceived as pro-government.

There are clearly vibrant and contentious debates taking place across newspapers whereby "media elites, especially columnists fiercely criticize each other's views."[18] In the interviews, many journalists said that they start the day by reading

what their perceived intellectual opponents in the other papers wrote and often respond to them in their own columns creating a significant ideational interaction.

Interviewed journalists also stated that any ideologically or economically motivated editorial pressures upon them mostly apply to the headlines of the papers or of individual articles on current issues. They said that they have significant freedom to write what they want in the content of their columns, especially in op-ed pieces.[19] Thus, it is important to cover the whole content of the papers, not only the headlines or major articles, in order to capture the actual pluralism of opinion among the media elites.

Finally, the media might have become an important site of discussion for elites because Turkey's quarrelsome parliament, combative political parties, and all-powerful party leaders limit the opportunities available to those elites for productive inter- and intra-party discussion. All of these factors strengthen the potential role of the press as a site of political activism and elite discussion, deliberation, and contestation.

Most Turkish newspapers are owned by business groups with political and social-ideological alliances, and are connected ideologically with different constituencies and social movements.[20] While privately owned, the press is vulnerable to political pressures because their owners' economic interests encourage them to develop clientelistic relations with the government and other political actors.[21] In 1996, the average daily circulations the newspapers covered by the content analysis (rounded up to the nearest thousand given in parentheses) were *Milli Gazete* (18,000), *Zaman* (259,000), *Yeni Şafak* (23,000), *Vakit* (partly examined, 35,000), *Milliyet* (629,000), and *Cumhuriyet* (48,000).[22] By 2008, the combined circulation of the religious newspapers had increased to about one million, while the circulation of *Cumhuriyet* remained almost the same but that of *Milliyet* had diminished to around 260,000.

The Content Analysis

Methodology

The goal of the content analysis was to track the relative attention to, and different views and judgments in the newspapers with respect to 13 categories (electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social pluralism, political pluralism, secularism, human rights, the Islamic headscarf controversy, group identity and grievances, nationalism, modernization, market economy, the western world, and foreign news) between 1996 and 2004.

The methodology was designed to balance different goals of content analysis. All content and discourse analyses face two tradeoffs, which impel researchers to forfeit one or two goals of analysis to some degree. The first tradeoff pertains to the choice between two benchmark goals: targeting the hidden or latent meaning in a small number of texts versus targeting the manifest meaning in a large number of texts. By targeting the hidden meaning, one gains in the potential value and sophistication of the inference made. For example, one can deconstruct a text to detect some "sexist" assumptions embedded, of which the author may not even be aware of. The analyst

can also aim to uncover the meanings that the authors of the texts intended to convey, which may require the analyst to read multiple texts written by the same author and to investigate each author's personal and intellectual history. The price is that one loses in the degree to which the information obtained is generalizable and testable, and in the degree to which the method used by the analyst is transparent. The inference made is likely to be specific to a small number of texts, as examining the hidden meaning in a text requires multiple, "deep" or thorough readings of the text possibly coupled with ethnographic research. Since such readings are also likely to be made by one scholar, the information obtained tends to depend on that particular analyst's interpretations.

By comparison, targeting the manifest meaning makes it possible to cover a much larger number of texts. The information becomes more generalizable and reliable because the analysis covers a large number of texts and because the inferences will depend on the interpretations of a much larger number of analysts working with the same rules and definitions. For some inferences computer software can also be used. The rules and definitions the analysts work with should be transparent so that their findings can be comparable.[23] However, the price is that the information obtained will be thinner in the sense that this type of analysis has less potential to uncover the whole, implicit, or dominant meanings of the texts, or the implicit intentions of the authors. For example, it can infer direct or explicit criticisms or commendations of a worldview such as liberalism, but cannot detect indirect or implicit criticisms. It can detect that a text includes ideas that are both favoring and opposing a policy, but cannot necessarily infer which ones dominate the text. It cannot infer whether or not the text itself, or the author's worldview, is coherent.

The second tradeoff is between targeting what can be called positive inference and normative inference. Positive inference refers to, for example, how terminology changes by examining the frequency with which a certain codeword is employed in text, how popular a subject is by examining the frequency with which a certain subject category is openly discussed, or how frequently a certain syntax of words is used. Normative inference covers normative values employed and judgments made in texts with respect to groups, subjects, and social, political and economic questions.

Targeting the positive inference facilitates the analysis and diminishes its cost: the research can be completed with a smaller team of analysts, by using computer software, and within a shorter period of time. Targeting the normative inference increases the cost of research but enables one to gain more insight. In general, manual analyses can make normative inference more effectively but at a higher cost than computer software. The development of efficient content analysis software requires the resolution of many language-specific problems; as of the writing of this article, software for Turkish texts was in the process of development.[24]

In terms of these tradeoffs, the method used in the content analysis here was designed to make both positive and normative inferences regarding manifest meanings. The sample of newspapers was kept as large and representative as possible. A team of twenty analysts (coders) analyzed the contents of these newspapers in

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Istanbul and Ankara libraries between April 2007 and December 2008. In about 4850 newspaper issues, more than 42,463 articles were found relevant and analyzed. Hence, inherent problems of reliability and generalizability were minimized by covering the whole contents of a large number of issues, distributing the issues among 20 analysts with no consecutive day examined by the same person, by having each analyst employ the same rules and definitions of categories, and having them answer the same set of questions, in coding the texts.[25]

The methodology is original, and in some ways similar to the manual holistic and deductive approaches to framing analyses.[26] The primary aim is to document and quantify expressed meaning in a replicable and systematic fashion, and then interpret the findings in light of their social-political context.[27] In terms of framing analyses, the goal is to uncover meaning from the "receiver's" point of view, rather than that of the authors'.[28]

Accordingly, the coders were instructed not to try to infer the overall opinion of an article. For example, if an article on nationalism contained both critical and favorable arguments and examples, they were instructed to code both favorable and unfavorable views on nationalism, without trying to evaluate which ones were more dominant. They also had an option to code a neutral view when no normative claims were made. This reduced the role of their subjective judgments as their job was not to make predictions and judgments about the authors' intentions or an article's main, or dominant, viewpoint. The analysts were also instructed to code each article as they understood it after a maximum of three readings.

What the method compares across time and newspapers are the subjects discussed, ideas, views, values, and code words. By counting them, as opposed to articles or frames, the analysis also captures considerations, i.e. reasons that might induce people to decide in one way or another in the future, by tracking the changing composition and balance of different ideas, views, and values within the articles.[29]

For example, a person may oppose restrictions of Islamic headscarf for two different reasons, "they violate Islam" and "they limit freedom of education." Each represents a view. The latter view would also be just a consideration if it were infrequently expressed in comparison to the former. Over time, however, it could become more frequently expressed and convince more people to oppose the restrictions if people can more easily agree on the value of education than on religious principles. To give another example, in a group of articles, most ideas and examples may be favorable to social pluralism but a small number may mention incidents where social pluralism led to degeneration. If the latter type of ideas and examples become more frequent over time, more critical views on social pluralism in general may emerge.

In terms of framing analyses, this enables one to infer the emergence of new frames, rather than just capturing a fixed group of pre-determined frames. Frames are "the sum of [their] parts."[30] A combination of interrelated views rarely expressed in one year may become more expressed later and thus form a new frame.

The actual analysis was conducted in three parts. During the preliminary analysis, first, potential subject categories were decided deductively from theories of religion, democracy, and pluralism. Then, one full-time graduate assistant and the author

examined roughly 1200 randomly selected articles from the target newspapers and identified subjects, ideas, and questions the newspapers discussed. This improved the validity of the subject categories coded in the actual analysis.[31] These categories were then merged with the deductively derived ones in order to create the actual tables that listed all the different subjects, ideas, views and value judgments, and code words which the analysts coded while creating a profile of the contents of each newspaper.

Before the second, main part of the analysis, twenty analysts were recruited through interviews aimed at excluding individuals strongly opinionated on the issue of religion, secularism and democracy.[32] They were then given a one-week long training during which they were taught, for example, according to which definition they were supposed to decide whether or not an article was related to the subject category "electoral democracy."

With a view to maximize inter-coder reliability, test analyses were conducted during the training: the trainees examined the same articles and discussed each other's codings with regard to consistency and whether or not they employed the same rules and definitions. These analysts then content analyzed the printed copies of the newspaper issues assigned to them. During the actual analysis, analysts coded articles independently but random checks were conducted to check for coherence and compliance with the rules.[33]

The third part of the analysis comprised the compilation, comparative analysis, and interpretation of the findings. During this period, unstructured, in-depth interviews were conducted with journalists.[34]

While interpreting the findings, the objective was to compare newspapers and to identify the findings that indicated change, or lack of change, over time, in a given social-political context. In content analyses, absolute frequencies are difficult to interpret; for example, in an advanced democracy, references to democracy may be lower than in a less developed democracy because democracy is an undisputed norm in the former.[35] But in another context, lack of any reference may have another meaning: censorship or weak support for democracy.

Thus, the interpretation of the findings was concentrated on changing frequencies given the context. An increasing frequency of positive talk about democracy within a newspaper was interpreted to indicate a rising interest in, and positive value change on, democracy. Across newspapers, if more positive references to democracy were found in one than in another, this was interpreted as a sign that pro-democracy value change was occurring in the former newspaper, without necessarily making any inference regarding the latter.[36] Across comparable subjects, a high number of codings in one category compared to another was interpreted as an indication of interest in, and controversy about, the former subject.

Inferences were made about unchanging, or patently low, frequencies of a discussion (i.e. silence) only when the social-political context strongly indicated the need for deliberation on a certain subject. In this case, lack of open deliberation was interpreted as a potential problem. For example, low frequency of talk about any measures against future earthquakes in a society frequently struck by earthquakes that cause heavy damage due to poor building codes would indicate a potential problem.

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
Finally, combined with historical event analysis, changing frequencies of codings helped to explain why (in response to which events) and how (through which discussions) actors changed their views. Since the findings made sense in their historical context, this also suggested that the content analysis was conducted appropriately and made valid inferences.

Is There A Consensus On Pluralistic (Political) Democracy?

There is considerable elite consensus on the overall value of democracy as an ideal, and on the desirability of its liberal, pluralistic kind. As discussed below, the problems lie in the issues of trust that seem to result from value gaps on other issues, and deficits in applying pluralistic-democratic principles to specific problems and groups other than one's own.[37] As a goal in itself, however, democracy is valued by both groups. Over nine years, ideas pertaining to democracy were coded 10,331 times. Only a minority—10.4 and 5.8 percent in the religious and secular press respectively—were negative ideas on democracy discussing any flaws or weaknesses.[38]

There is also consensus on the general value of liberal democracy. Religious elites' support of liberal democracy (71 percent of codings) converged on a similar value as secular elite support of liberal democracy (73 percent).[39] To distinguish it from basic, electoral democracy, liberal democracy was defined for the analysts as "the discussion of democracy by emphasizing its features such as freedoms, human rights, rule of law, and minority rights."

Elites also viewed liberal democracy as an insurance of themselves and their ideological interests. The idea that "liberal democracy is a means for Muslims to protect themselves through rights and freedoms" was approved in the religious press 232 times (83 percent of all the times this idea was coded). Similarly, the idea of liberal democracy "as a system protecting and insuring universal rights and freedoms, secularism and the seculars" was approved 828 times, or 85 percent of all the codings of this idea in the secular press.

The Transformation of Turkish Islamism

A major source of this convergence is the value transformation of political Islamism, which had long been seen as an authoritarian and anti-systemic force in Turkish democracy.[40] A simple sign of this transformation is the evaluation of democracy, especially liberal democracy. Positive ideas on electoral democracy increased in the religious press from 65 percent (872 codings) in the 1996–1999 period to 71 percent (428 codings) in the 2001–2004 period.[41] More drastically, positive ideas on liberal democracy increased from 69 percent (1329 codings) in the 1996–1999 period to 76 percent (871 codings) in the 2001–2004 period.[42] While the idea of "liberal democracy as a means for Muslims to protect themselves through rights and freedoms" was criticized nine times in the former period, there was only one critical coding in the latter period. By comparison, the evaluation of liberal democracy remained about the same in the secular press, being 74 percent positive

(1147 codings) and three percent negative (54 codings) in the 1996–1999 period and 72 percent positive (763 codings) and five percent negative (49 codings) in the 2001–2004 period.

The findings indicate that there was a lively debate on democracy in the religious press, which is reflected by the high number of codings in the 1996–1999 period, before the foundation of AKP and its consolidation power. Furthermore, investigating the data more closely reveals that a major shift in the conceptualization of democracy occurred after the secularist military intervention in 1997 (dubbed the February 28 intervention), which forced the Islamist-led coalition government to resign. In 1996 and 1997, the frequencies of electoral and liberal definitions of democracy were more or less equal whenever there was a discussion of democracy. The ratio of liberal to electoral conceptualization was 1.1.[43] In 1998, the ratio increased to 1.8, and to 2.5 and 3.4 in the subsequent two years, and remained around 2 in the remaining years.

This indicates a remarkable transformation of how democracy was viewed by the religious elite. Before 1998, the value of democracy equally stemmed from elections' potential to bring the majority's will upon government and from its liberal benefits such as rights and freedoms. After 1998, the latter gained prominence. During interviews, religious-conservative journalists confirmed that the authoritarian practices of the February 28 intervention reinforced an existing discussion on liberal democracy within the Islamic intelligentsia, helping them to better appreciate European standards of rights, freedoms, and rule of law.

This change in the thinking clearly offered an intellectual basis for the AKP's formation in 2001 with a remarkably more liberal rhetoric and ideological outlook than any previous Islamist political party. This critical shift of thinking helped the AKP to gain the support of many secular liberal circles, win the elections in 2002, and gain the approval of the EU as a result of its reformist policies between 2002 and 2004.

Secular Division and Cynicism but Not Necessarily Authoritarianism

The transformation of Turkish Islamism boded well for democratization. However, this shift of thinking was not found credible by major segments of the secular elites. This implies that successful democratization takes convergence of values as well as trust between elites.[44] Many secular elites were suspicious of Islamists' commitment to both electoral and liberal democracy.

Figure 1 illustrates the point on electoral democracy. The subject of democracy as a means or goal for Islamists was not a particularly important issue of discussion for the religious elites (six codings per newspaper per year), the frequency of the codings did not change much over years, and there was similar support for electoral democracy both as a means and an end (53 and 42 percent respectively). By comparison, the subject was more discussed by secular elites (17 codings per newspaper per year) throughout the period. 57 percent of codings showed suspicion that Islamists could embrace electoral democracy as an end goal.

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Figure 1.   Electoral Democracy as Means or Goal for Islamists – Religious-Conservative and Pro-Secular Press.

But the secular elites were divided on this question. Suspicion diminished and faded away in *Milliyet* after the AKP came to power in 2002. By contrast, it grew in *Cumhuriyet*, and in 2004 it reached the same level it had in 1997, during the old Islamist party government.

The secular elites did not find it credible that the Islamists could embrace liberal democracy as an efficient way to pursue their own ends, either. The idea of liberal democracy "as a system facilitating the Islamists' pursuit of their own ends" was discussed 235 times in the secular press, but 72 percent showed disbelief. In the eyes of the secular elites, Islamists could not embrace liberal democracy even for instrumental reasons. Although the civil and political rights and freedoms embedded in liberal democracy provide ample opportunities for Islamists to express their agenda, persuade people and promote their cause, seculars did not see it that way.

Importantly, religious-conservative governments increased the seculars' cynicism while making the conservative more optimistic. Seculars rejected the idea that Islamists can embrace liberal democracy as a way to pursue their goals at a higher rate (77 percent) when a religious government was in power (1997, 2002–2004) than in other years (66 percent). On the other hand, religious elites supported this idea more under religious governments (89 versus 80 percent). Secular suspicion increased between 1996–2000 (76 percent) and 2001–2004 (80 percent).

It is questionable, however, whether or not the secular suspicion of the Islamists necessarily translates into general authoritarianism in the sense of supporting military or judicial guardianship vis-à-vis elected governments. The secular press is overwhelmingly opposed to military interference with politics in general (83 percent in *Milliyet* and 57 percent in *Cumhuriyet*).

Notably, this opposition diminishes whenever the context is "military interference with politics to protect secularism (33 percent in *Milliyet* and 17 percent in *Cumhuriyet*).[45] This is a clear sign of the secular distrust of religious or non-secular politics. However, the secular press did not become more pro-military in years under religious-conservative governments, or between 1996–1999 and 2001–2004. In fact, *Milliyet*'s support of military interference to protect secularism decreased whenever a religious government was in power (21 percent), compared to other years (34 percent). By contrast, *Cumhuriyet* was more supportive of the military's role to protect secularism in years with religious government (50 percent) than in other years (44 percent), reflecting a division within the secular press.

In related findings, *Milliyet* expressed less critical views of the judiciary—which shut down eight political parties charged with anti-secularism between 1946 and 2001—whenever the context was the question of secularism (26 and 40 percent critical respectively), whereas *Cumhuriyet* did not make a strong distinction (17 vs. 14 percent). Figure 2 shows the findings for the two secular papers combined. Neither paper became more supportive of the judiciary in years when a religious government was in power.

While revealing the seculars' suspicions of the religious elites, these findings do not necessarily imply that these suspicions make the seculars support authoritarian state interventions against elected religious governments. Accordingly, notwithstanding popular perceptions among the religious elite, the plurality of the views in the secular papers (41 percent in *Milliyet* and 42 percent in *Cumhuriyet*) was critical of the "February 28 intervention" against the Islamists. The opposition was even higher in the context of "liberal democracy" (221 codings or 46 percent of both newspapers).[46]


Figure 2.   Pro-Secular View of the Judiciary, in General and in the Context of Secularism.

Is There A Religious-Secular Cleavage In The Media?

The contents of religious and secular newspapers are not necessarily different from each other with respect to all subjects. In suspicion of Kurdish nationalism, for example, a religious newspaper like *Milli Gazete* is often more similar to a secular paper like *Cumhuriyet* than to another religious paper like *Yeni Şafak*.[47] Likewise, the findings above showed that there was significant convergence on the overall value of political democracy between the religious and secular press.

In terms of interest in different subjects, Figure 3 shows the distribution of articles related to different subjects in both types of the press. Religious and secular press gave almost equal weight to electoral democracy, liberal democracy, modernization, and social pluralism.

The Secularism Divide

The pro-secular press devoted more space (at least 50 percent more) to secularism, human rights, political pluralism, and nationalism, and the religious-conservative devoted more space to the Islamic headscarf question (*başörtüsü*, *türban* or *tessettür*), group identity questions and Muslim grievances, and the West.

In terms of normative evaluations, the findings revealed a distinct gap between the groups of newspapers, whenever the discussion was related to religion, secularism, and social pluralism. An example of this is the content of national identity. Figure 4 shows which sources of national identity were highlighted during any discussion pertaining to nationalism. The two types of newspapers gave similar weight to territory (Anatolia or Turkey) in defining national identity. With respect to the importance of Islam versus Turkishness, the religious newspapers emphasized the former much more than the other.[48]

The difference between the religious and secular press becomes clearer on the question of secularism. For the religious press, the question of secularism (*laiklik*) was relatively less important (43 codings per newspaper per year, six percent of total codings), the plurality of the codings neutral, and critical codings (34 percent) were considerably more than favorable views (24 percent). By comparison, the secular press was more interested in the secularism question (100 codings per newspaper per year, 11 percent of total codings), and more homogeneous than the religious press: 74 percent of the codings were positive, with only two percent of codings being critical.

However, there was a division in the secular press on Kemalism in the context of secularism. Broadly speaking, Kemalism represents Atatürk's ideal of secular modernization. In the context of a critical evaluation of Turkish modernization, however, it denotes authoritarian and religion-skeptic modernization, and the problems of democratization that are associated with such modernization. Kemalism was a mainly negative, undesirable value for the religious press, as Figure 5 illustrates. It was considered a mainly positive value by the secular press. However, while critical views on Kemalism were visible in *Milliyet*, they were absent in *Cumhuriyet*.

**Figure 3.**   Distribution of Articles According to Subjects.

Figure 4.   Islam, Anatolia, and Turkishness as Bases of National Identity.

Part of the gap on secularism might stem from divergent understandings of secularism. Expectedly, religious and secular press emphasized different dimensions of secularism, but not as much as one might expect. In the religious press, 33.7 of the codings emphasized secularism as "separation of religion and state," 33.5 percent as "the supremacy of popular will as the basis of law and government," and 32.8 as "freedom of religion and conscience." In the secular press, the corresponding figures were 33.3 percent, 43.9 percent, and 22.8 percent, respectively.

The ideas of religion gaining more influence in state affairs and in social life were both rejected decisively in the secular press (87 and 67 percent), with only one and two percent of ideas being favorable respectively. There is relatively more agreement on religion's role in state affairs: 48 percent in the religious press was also critical of religion having more say in state affairs (but with 29 percent supporting it). However, 68 percent of the religious press supported religion's gaining more influence in social life, with only seven percent disagreeing. The idea of "religion

Figure 5.   Religious-Conservative Opposition to "Kemalism" in the Context of Secularism, and the Secular Split.

with functions in social regulation" was approved by 80 percent in the religious (only one percent critical) and was disapproved by 70 percent of the secular press (14 percent favorable).

Social Pluralism

In light of these findings, it is not surprising that the normative evaluation of social pluralism reflected a distinct gap between the religious and secular press. Social pluralism was defined for the analysts as "the diversity of social, cultural, religious, and similar groups (such as different life styles or different interpretations of a philosophy or religion), the relations between these groups, and the benefits of, or problems caused by, such diversity."

   In the secular press, the majority of ideas (59 percent) emphasized the value of social pluralism, with only 11 percent critical codings. By contrast, the religious press was divided between 38 percent favorable, and 36 percent critical codings that refer to the problems social pluralism may create. The religious elite are more divided on, and on average considerably less open to, the expression and coexistence of different religious, cultural, philosophical, or sexual preferences in social life.[49]

Elite Values Encumbering Democratization

The Kurdish question can be shown as an example where the government's efforts to promote liberalization and de-securitization in a major ethnic-political conflict

are weakened by, among other factors, insufficient prior change in the thinking of religious-conservative elites, and distrust of the AKP and EU-cynicism of the secular elite. A full illustration of this argument based on data from the content analysis is presented elsewhere.[50] For example, in July 2009, the AKP government initiated an initiative known as Kurdish or democratic opening aimed to address the Kurdish conflict through negotiations and democratic-political reforms. As of the writing of this article, however, this initiative brought few concrete results and faced significant resistance from the opposition and the government's own constituencies in addition to increased Kurdish separatist violence.

The fact that the AKP government embarked on this bold initiative can be linked with two findings. The liberal political transformation of Turkish Islamism explained above, and the fact that the religious elite are relatively more open to ethnic identity-based politics, which, many religious actors believe, would not cause disintegration thanks to the common religious bond uniting ethnic Turks and Kurds. Accordingly, "the right of ethnic parties to exist" was approved by 37 percent and disapproved by only 15 percent of the codings in the religious press, compared to 18 and 38 percent respectively in the secular press.

In turn, two types of findings help to explain the resistance to the opening. By itself, openness to identity politics is insufficient to sustain the Kurdish opening. It also requires openness to various concrete reforms such as education in Kurdish or amnesty for Kurdish militants, which continue to be taboo among major segments of Turkish society. Did the religious thinking change, or was it more liberal than the secular thinking, on such questions? The findings indicate neither. Only one example is provided here: Figure 6 shows that the amount of discussion that occurred on education and TV in Kurdish was considerably less in the religious press compared to the secular press. The findings did not indicate that the religious papers as a group


Figure 6. The Frequency of Discussion of Education and TV in Kurdish in Religious-Conservative and Pro-Secular Press.

Figure 7.   Pro-Secular Elite View of the EU's Influence on Territorial Integrity.

was more open to this idea than the secular papers, either. *Yeni Şafak* was most favorable (51 percent), followed by pro-secular *Milliyet* (48 percent), *Zaman* (30 percent), pro-secular *Cumhuriyet* (14 percent), and *Milli Gazete* (11 percent). These findings suggest that while the AKP leadership might have felt compelled to launch the Kurdish opening in order to resolve this long-festering problem, the Islamic-conservative elites at large do not seem to have sufficient ideational preparation to fully back and sustain its implementation.

Finally, the secular press grew suspicious of the EU's impact on Turkey's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, which weakens potential secular support for the opening. One example of this finding is illustrated by Figure 7.

Conclusion

People who write in the press form an important component of the Turkish intelligentsia and political elite. Systematic analysis of their thinking should be a significant component of explaining democratic development, and, sometimes, lack thereof.

The Turkish press is rightly criticized for many of its flaws, such as the conflicts between its private economic interests and its public responsibility to inform the citizenry, or specific papers' ideologically biased editorial decisions in response to specific political developments.

These flaws aside, however, one might ask the following question. Given the apparent weakness of self-reflective and pluralistic internal debate within political parties and the parliament, how else could elite thinking change such that the elite develop a more categorical appreciation of pluralistic democracy and new and more

574   *M. Somer*

constructive ideas for resolving long-term questions such as secularism, EU relations, and the Kurdish question? Arguably, such change of elite thinking is necessary for the consolidation of a pluralistic democracy with European standards. In this respect, the findings of the systematic and comprehensive content analysis presented in this article shows that the press plays an important role as a public forum for elite discussion. This role of the press needs more attention and conceptualization.

Broadly speaking, the Turkish press seems to fit the image of the polarized-pluralist Mediterranean model. However, when one examines all the views expressed in the press and not just the headlines or the dominant view of each newspaper, the findings reveal that there is much more internal pluralism, discussion and dissent within both religious and secular elites than often perceived. This is true even on issues such as secularism where there is a clear gap of values between religious and secular elites.

The findings also reveal that elites reached considerable consensus over time regarding desirability of pluralistic democracy, if not over how to resolve the *ex ante* conflicts that need to be resolved in order to actually build pluralistic democracy. Furthermore, the findings can be linked with several features of Turkey's democratization during the AKP government. The government is credited with a number of political reforms in the 2002–2005 period, which earned Turkey the beginning of EU accession talks in 2005. This can be linked with Turkish Islamism's political-intellectual rapprochement with liberal democracy revealed by the findings.

On the deficit side, however, the AKP government was accompanied by a growing polarization between religious-conservative and pro-secular political actors, and suffered from a weakness of cross-party consensus and cooperation for democratic reforms. This can be linked with the findings that indicate the secular distrust of the religious elites' adoption of liberal democracy, and those that indicate a gap over the question of religion and secularism. Finally, the AKP government was criticized for allowing or promoting Islamic-conservatism, and failing to deepen the EU-led reforms after 2005. This can be linked with the religious elites' dislike of social pluralism, the secular elites' distrust of the religious-conservatives, the value gaps between the two over religion and secularism, and relative silence on critical issues such as the Kurdish issue or the Alevis (findings not shown here) that need discussion and deliberation.

Though the media elite is divided around issues of religion, secularism, and social pluralism, the internal pluralism within each group and consensus over the desirability of pluralistic democracy can be used to advance pluralistic democracy. Legal-institutional reforms strengthening journalistic freedoms and professionalism and improving the diversity and quality of the media discussions are necessary. In this case, the discussions in the media can more effectively contribute to the emergence of full-fledged elite consensus on pluralistic democracy, thereby approaching the role with which Yalman credited the Turkish press.

Acknowledgements

Aktürk, Ali Çarkoğlu, Patrick James, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Evangelos Liaras, and John Waterbury for comments; Aykut Arıkan for a reference; and Hande Özhabeş, Ebru Eren, and an excellent group of students in Istanbul and Ankara for research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

1. Other criticisms include oligopolistic ownership with business interests outside the media, weak regulation, job in security, and lack of professionalism. Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel, "The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1996), pp. 109–123. Hasan Cemal, *Cumhuriyet'i Çok Sevmiştim: Cumhuriyet Gazetesi'ndeki "iç savaş"ın perde arkası* [I Used to Love Cumhuriyet So Much: Behind the Scenes of the "Internal War" in Cumhuriyet Newspaper] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003). Beybin Kejanlıoğlu, *Türkiye'de Medyanın Dönüşümü* [The transformation of the media in Turkey] (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2004). Gülseren Adaklı, *Türkiye'de Medya Endüstrisi: Neoliberalizm Çağında Mülkiyet ve Kontrol İlişkileri* [Media Industry in Turkey: Ownership and Control Relationships in the Age of Neoliberalism] (Ankara: Ütopya Yayınları, 2006). Serhat Kaymas, "Devlet ve Sermaye Sarmalında Türkiye Medyası: Ekonomik Krizler, Medya ve Demokrasi," [Turkish Media in the Spiral of State and Capital: Economic Crises, Media and Democracy], *İletişim: Galatasaray Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi*, Vol. 8 (2008), pp. 77–107.
2. For an earlier example, see Şahin Alpay cited in Cemal (2005), pp. 119–120.
3. Meryem Erdal, *Herkesin Yargısı Kendine: Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Basının Yargı Algısı* [My Judiciary, Your Judiciary: The Press' Perception of the Judiciary during the Democratization Process] (Istanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2010). Mine Gencel Bek, "Turkish Journalists' Views on Their Profession and the Mechanisms of News Production in the Changing Media Environment," *Boğaziçi Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1–2 (2004), pp. 43–57. L. Doğan Tılıç, "Milliyetçilik ve Yeni Sahiplik Yapısı Kıskacında Türk Medyası," [Turkish Media in the Claws of Nationalism and New Ownership Structure], Birikim, Vol. 117 (1999), pp. 44–47. Mustafa Sönmez, "Türk Medya Sektöründe Yoğunlaşma ve Sonuçları," [Concentration in Turkish Media Sector and its Consequences], Birikim, Vol. 92 (1996), pp. 76–86.
4. James Bohman, "Political Communication and the Epistemic Value of Diversity: Deliberation and Legitimation in Media Societies," *Communication Theory*, Vol. 17 (2007), pp. 348–355. Jurgen Habermas, "Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research," *Communication Theory*, Vol. 16 (2006), pp. 411–426. Cass R. Sunstein, *Republic.com* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
5. Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
6. Ibid.
7. Tılıç (1999). Alper Görmüş, "Medya – İktidar: Ne olmuştu Ne olmakta," [Media – Power: What happened What is happening], Birikim, Vol. 234 (2008), pp. 49–51.
8. Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1993), pp. 51–58. Shanto Iyengar, "Agenda Setting and Beyond: Television News and the Strength of Political Issues," in William H. Riker (ed.), *Agenda Formation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 211–230. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, *Choices, Values, and Frames* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Donald R. Kinder, "Communication and Opinion," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (1988), pp. 167–197. Thomas E. Patterson, *Out of Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).
9. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1965). Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 206–261. Kinder (1988), p. 183.

576   *M. Somer*

10. John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

11. Jeffrey Friedman, "Democratic Competence in Normative and Positive Theory: Neglected Implications of 'the Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics'," *Critical Review*, Vol. 18, Nos 1–3 (2006), pp. i–xliii.

12. Among 45 countries with a Muslim majority, Turkey ranked in 2005 the 10th highest in terms of GDP per capita but only the 19th in terms of education (UNDP, 2007/2008). The Turkish public's trust in the media is lower than its trust in the armed forces (religious institutions), the legal system, and the political system, but it is higher than its trust in companies, Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basañez, and Alejandro Moreno, "Human Values and Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook: Political, Religious, Sexual, and Economic Norms in 43 Societies; Findings from the 1990–1993 World Value Survey (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).

13. Hallin and Mancini (2004).

14. Rodney Benson and Daniel C. Hallin, "How States, Markets and Globalization Shape the News: The French and US National Press, 1965–97," *European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2007), pp. 27–48.

15. The author's interview with the editor of a major "religious-conservative" newspaper.

16. Gamze Çavdar, "Islamist *New Thinking* in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 121, No. 3 (2006), pp. 486–487. p. 482).

17. Bek (2004), p. 50.

18. Şermin Tekinalp, "Postmodernist Dördüncü Kuvvet: Köşe Yazarları," [The Postmodernist Fourth Power: The Newspaper Columnists], Istanbul Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi, Vol. 31 (2008), pp. 119–130.

19. One of the journalists also suggested that there are ideological "insiders" and "outsiders" within each paper and that editorial pressures affected the former more than the latter.

20. *Cumhuriyet* is owned by the Cumhuriyet Vakfı (Republic Foundation).

21. See Daniel C. Hallin and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, "Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective," *Media, Culture & Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2002), pp. 175–195, for clientelism and media in comparative perspective.

22. The five papers generated roughly 22 percent of total newspaper circulation in 1996. In 1996, Vakit was published under the name *Akit*. The analysis of this newspaper was abandoned after covering one and a half years of its issues, because of too many missing past issues in libraries. It was replaced with *Milli Gazete*, after verifying that the results were similar to that of *Vakit*. Insights gained from the partial analysis of *Vakit* contributed to the interpretation of the findings.

23. Note that the point here is not necessarily about a tradeoff between subjectivity and objectivity. Language is inherently inter-subjective. The difference is in the depth and sophistication of the meaning targeted and in the number of analysts on whose judgments the analysis rests.

24. See B. Aykut Arıkan, M. Deniz Tansi, and Nilüfer Hatemi, Bilgisayar Destekli Türkçe Tabanlı Medya İçerik Çözümleme Sistemi [Computer Aided and Turkish Based Media Content Analysis System], Project Number 107K209, Tübitak, December 2008.

25. The analysts were instructed to analyze any content (i.e. all articles) in the newspapers that had a link to the 13 subject categories defined. Although advertisements and sports articles were normally excluded, the analysts were instructed to examine them if an article had an explicit reference to one of the subject categories, say, a sports article discussing the rising "nationalist fanaticism in sports."

26. Frank R. Baumgartner, Suzanna L. De Boef, and Amber E. Boydstun, *The Decline of the Death Penalty and the Discovery of Innocence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Yoshiko M. Herrera, *Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (London: Sage Publications, 2004). Jörg Matthes and Matthias Kohring, "The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Toward Improving Reliability and Validity," *Journal of Communication*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2008), pp. 258–279.

27. Krippendorff (2004), pp. 18–25.

28. Entman (1993).
29. Zaller (1992), p. 40.
30. Matthes and Kohring (2008), p. 274.
31. Ibid.
32. Four undergraduate and sixteen graduate assistants, ten males and ten females.
33. Reliability was further checked when two new coders analyzed two months of *Yeni Şafak* and their findings were compared to the original findings.
34. The journalists were interviewed in October–November 2008 (and combined with some earlier interviews conducted in April 2005) and had worked (at different times) in *Yeni Şafak, Zaman, Today's Zaman, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Radikal*, and *Taraf*. In order to protect their privacy, comments are not linked to specific actors.
35. Krippendorff (2004), pp. 60–62.
36. Note that the environment, i.e. the potential news and social-political agenda they can potentially cover, is similar for each newspaper as they are all national papers from Turkey.
37. For further analysis, see Murat Somer, "Does It Take Democrats to Democratize?: Lessons From Islamic and Secular Elite Values in Turkey," *Comparative Political Studies* (Forthcoming, 2011).
38. Most negative codings in the religious press came from *Milli Gazete*, which is the most conservative-Islamist one among the three and had 17 percent negative codings.
39. *Electoral democracy* was defined for the analysts as "the discussion of democracy by emphasizing its roles in determining the rulers through elections and in bringing the will of the people (*halk*) upon government."
40. Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in An Islamic Society* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007).
41. The findings reveal limited open discussion of potential contradictions between democracy, a system based in the supremacy of people's will, and Islam, which is based in the supremacy of God's will. The idea that "democracy can be used *unless* it contradicts Islam" was coded only 16 times in three newspapers over nine years.
42. Criticisms of liberal democracy decreased 12 to 9 percent. In 2000, the percentages of positive and negative ideas were 71 and 11 percent respectively.
43. See endnote 39 for the way the two were defined for the analysts.
44. Murat Somer, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 7 (2007), pp. 1271–1289.
45. Support for military interference was in general 3 and 14 percent, and "to protect secularism" 27 and 47 percent, in *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* respectively.
46. Part of this perception might stem from the disproportionate impact that headlines have on perceptions. In 1997 and 1998, for example, the codings in the front pages of *Milliyet* were evenly distributed between favorable, unfavorable, and neutral views of the intervention, while the overwhelming majority was negative or neutral in the rest of the newspaper. The reverse relation held between front and back pages in *Cumhuriyet*. The findings did not show major differences between "news articles" and "commentaries."
47. Murat Somer and Evangelos G. Liaras, "Turkey's New Kurdish Opening: Religious versus Secular Values," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2010), pp. 152–165.
48. In defining Turkishness, ethnicity (1%) and language (7%) received low emphasis by secular newspapers, compared to alternative attachments such as territory (25%), citizenship (15%), and shared history in the 20th century (25%)—out of a total 1110 references.
49. For details, see Somer (Forthcoming, 2011) and Murat Somer, "The Janus-Faced Relation of Religious Non-State Actors and Human Security: Islamic and Secular Values in Turkey," in James Wellman, ed, *Religion and Human Security* (Forthcoming). For related data on the secular and religious public's social preferences, see Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* [Religion, Society, and Politics in a Changing Turkey] (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2006).
50. Somer and Liaras (2010).