

PIETRO DALL'ARA

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Research Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Information Design.

Education

- 2020 Ph.D. in Economics, Boston College (expected completion in 2024.)
- 2018 M.A. in Economics, Boston College (*en route.*)
- 2018 M.A. in Economics, University of Bologna (*cum laude.*)
- 2016 B.A. in Business and Economics, University of Bologna.

Visits

- 2023 Visiting Ph.D. Student, European University Institute.
- 2018 Erasmus, École Normale Supérieure Paris-Saclay.

Research

JOB MARKET PAPER

Coordination in a Complex World

I explore how complexity — uncertainty incurred by taking innovative actions — affects coordination. I introduce complexity in a coordination game through the presence of status quo actions, so that: the more innovative an action, the more uncertain its outcome. The introduction of complexity preserves the strategic complementarities of the coordination game and leads to new coordination problems. I study the implications of complexity for the management of multi-division organizations: complexity can “implement” the same expected profits as if decision rights were centralized. In a model of price competition, complexity induces conformity: as the environment becomes more complex, firms opt for more similar pricing policies. [\[slides.\]](#)

WORKING PAPERS

The Extensive Margin of Bayesian Persuasion

I study the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts attention effort. The sender uses information to incentivize the receiver to pay attention. I show that

persuasion mechanisms are equivalent to signals. In a model of media capture, the sender finds it optimal to censor high states. [\[slides.\]](#)

Double Votes

Double votes are used by standard-setting organizations and for unionization decisions. I study the ability of double votes to aggregate information dispersed among voters, in the sense of adopting the same policy as under symmetric information. A double vote aggregates information in situations in which a single vote fails to aggregate information. [\[slides.\]](#)

Policy Competition with Conformity

I study a spatial model of elections where parties face a complex environment. Each party represents a combination of an agent of a constituency of voters and a career-concerned politician. Complexity lessens platform divergence and platforms converge if career concerns are sufficiently strong.

Teaching Experience

PRIMARY INSTRUCTOR

Game Theory (Fall 2023)

TEACHING ASSISTANT

Ph.D. Micro Theory II (Spring 2022, Spring 2023)

Ph.D. Micro Theory I (Fall 2021, Fall 2022)

Statistics (Fall 2020, Spring 2021)

Machine Learning (Spring 2020)

Market Design (Fall 2019)

Macro Theory (Spring 2019)

Talks

- 2023-24 Young Economists Meeting (Collegio Carlo Alberto, Turin), Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting (TX).
- 2022-2023 Econometric Society European Summer Meeting (Barcelona), European University Institute (Micro Group), University of Bologna, 1st BC-BU Theory Conference, Warwick Ph.D. Conference, Queen Mary Ph.D. Workshop, Boston University Theory Reading Group, Brown Theory/Experimental Lunch Seminar.
- 2021 Brown Theory/Experimental Lunch Seminar.

Fellowships

- 2023 BC Visiting Fellowship
- 2023 Donald J. White Teaching Excellence Award
- 2022-2023 Clough Fellowship
- 2022 BC Dissertation Fellowship (Summer)

2020 BC Summer Fellowship
2019 BC Summer Fellowship
2017 U. of Bologna, merit-based fellowship

Miscellanea

Organizer of Theory Reading Group (Spring 2022, Fall 2021) and Pre-Seminar Q&A (Spring 2023.)

Article: Central Bank Communication with the General Public, *Symposium of the Clough Center for Constitutional Democracy*, 2023.

Student Representative in Joint Committee (*Commissione Paritetica*), U. of Bologna.

Nationality: Italian.

References

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